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Abstract  
The thesis titled „More is Less: The Political Economy of the MiFID Revision“ aims to 
reveal to what extent different preferences of individual Member States on EU financial 
regulation affect the increase in complexity of financial legislative acts, concretely 
MiFID II. Using three theoretical building-blocks in a classical framework of political 
economy, we argue that divergence of member states is inherent to their different 
capitalist environments (Varieties of Capitalism). Aligning these differences with the 
common, harmonized regime can create costs and cause market disadvantages. 
Therefore, Member States try to push for as similar legislation to their own as possible, 
to minimize the costs.  The result is a disproportionately long legislative act, that was 
crafted in a way to satisfy individual preferences of Member States, through 
discretionary provisions, exemptions and other. We also investigate how much 
harmonization the original MiFID established, asking if some provision became less 
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 Ever since the last financial crisis reached the shores and pockets of the European 
Union, almost a decade ago, there has been an eruption of different compliance-related, 
catchy acronyms, abbreviations of different EU legal documents, that aimed to answer the 
causes and the consequences of the crisis on a European-wide, harmonized basis.  Most of 
those – CRD IV, EMIR, AIFMD, SFTR1, to name a few, created a major shift in the balance 
sheets and business strategies of almost every single financial institution in the EU (EEA), as 
well as a solid number of non-financial institutions, whose business operations had something 
to do with derivatives, which were seen as one of the major culprits of the 2007 crisis. All of 
those aforementioned, and many other acronyms, were, however, mainly aimed at one or, 
alternatively, a handful of business operations a company was performing, and remained 
familiar to only a limited number of business divisions. But if one were to ask an average 
dealer, a broker, a business analyst, a project manager, a compliance officer, a risk analyst, an 
investment advisor, a member of junior, middle or senior management, what acronym is 
currently the word of the day in the European financial market regulation due to its scope, 
effect, costs and brain effort necessary to internalize it, without a doubt it would be the one 
that is the subject of this paper - the “notorious” MiFID.  
 MiFID, or Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, actually refers to two different 
financial regulation directives of the European Union and of the Council, that are 10 years 
apart from each other – the original MiFID (also known as Directive 2004/39/EC) and the 
revised MiFID, colloquially known and often referred to as MiFID II (Directive 2014/65/EU), 
which repealed and updated the original Directive. At the first glance, a major difference, 
inter alia, was that the MiFID II was a package – consisting of one Directive (the MiFID), 
                                                 
1 Stands for: Capital Requirements Directives (with Capital Requirements Regulation 2013 and Credit 
Institutions Directive 2013); European Market Infrastructure Regulation 2012; Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers Directive 2011; Securities Financing Transactions Regulation 2015, respectively.  
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and one Regulation – the MiFIR, Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (Regulation 
2014/600/EU). The original MiFID, enacted in 2004, has been in implementation since 2007 
and it represents the linchpin of the 1999 Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), aimed at 
creating a single market in financial services. Described as “The Revolution” (Casey and 
Lannoo, 2009) this European Union rulebook brought several ground-breaking changes to the 
EU financial markets, with MiFID “passporting” probably being the most famous one, even 
to laymen2.  
 Despite being the most well-known endeavor of its sort on the European Union level, 
the original MiFID was not the first legal instrument whose purpose was the harmonization of 
the EU financial services and the creation of single market in those services.  The ISD 
(Investment Services Directive, Directive 93/22/EEC), the 1993 predecessor of the original 
MiFID, was the first such harmonization attempt – much smaller in size, scope and ambition. 
In the meantime, the EU adopted the so-called “Lamfalussy procedure”, which increased the 
speed of decision-making in financial regulation, but, critics say, also led to a severe increase 
in complexity3. Without any deeper analysis, one cannot but notice a staggering disproportion 
– the ISD had 32 Articles (20 pages), while the original MiFID, 11 years after, had 73 
Articles (44 pages). In turn, the MiFID II package, the latest enactment of its kind, has 97 
Articles (148 pages) and 55 Articles (65 pages), of MiFID and MiFIR text, respectively.  
 But what is causing this increase in complexity? The purpose of this paper is to try to 
provide an answer to that question, using the framework of qualitative political economy. 
This theoretical framework is consisting of three building blocks upon which this thesis is 
constructed.  
                                                 
2 One of the key topics in Brexit talks, due to the size and significance of the UK financial industry. 
3 At this point, we will understand an increase in legal complexity as an increase in the number of words and 
articles of the legal document. Further on in this paper, we will deal with this issue with deeper considerations 
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 The first building block is intergovernmentalism of the EU financial regulation of 
Story and Walter (1997), who have investigated preferences of Germany, France and the UK, 
trying to explain what sort of factors caused those preferences to diverge. The second 
building block of this thesis is the advocacy coalition framework in EU financial regulation, 
given by Quaglia (2010), which introduced “belief-systems” and not just mere interests, as 
determinants of possible member-state coalitions. The theoretical framework is finally 
completed by a comparative case study of ISD – MiFID evolution, done by Kudrna (2011). In 
other words, we acknowledge the varieties of capitalism as the cause of different approaches 
to financial regulation by different member states, which in turn incentivizes them to forge 
alliances with like-minded member states in order to make the common regulatory framework 
as close as possible to their own. Investigating the joint-decision trap and asking has the 
Lamfalussy procedure found a way around it, Kudrna, in his comparative case study, 
juxtaposes the decision-making of ISD with the original MiFID.  
 Upon the building-blocks stated above, we construct the case that argues that increase 
in complexity is best understood as a result of negotiations between coalitions with differing 
preferences. Influential member states are not willing to cede and are trying to shape the 
common legislation as close as possible to their own, in an attempt to benefit from lower 
implementation costs and comparative advantages over other member states.  Consequently, 
the legislation is full of exceptions, discretions and adaptations on the most contested issues, 
which directly leads to an increase in number of articles and length of the legislative acts. 
Despite certain improves in harmonization, there is a long way to go.  
 The two research hypotheses are: 
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Hypothesis 1: Controlling for the financial crisis and technological progress, MiFID 
II shows significant increase in complexity, due to the differing preferences of key 
member states, which have not substantially converged since the inception of ISD.  
Hypothesis 2: However, a certain degree of convergence is present, and it manifests 
through the provisions existing in the original MiFID, but disappearing in the follow-
up package, due to the less complexity required.  
 In order to prove those hypotheses, we proceed with a two-step analysis, a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative approach. First, we construct a correlation table, 
that aims to compare the length of Articles in three documents – initial Commission MiFID II 
proposal; the follow-up proposal of the Council and the final MiFID II solution. To test the 
second hypothesis, we use correlation table in Annex IV of MiFID II Directive, which shows 
new repealing articles and their corresponding MiFID I matches.  
 In the second step, we analyze this quantitative result using qualitative argumentation, 
that shows how different preferences of member states have shaped this increase in the 
number of words and articles. Due to the political sensitivity of the issue in question, and the 
lack of access to relevant “off-the-record” information, as the main source of data we have 
focused on the official documents of the EU created during the MiFID review. To fill for the 
lacunae in the negotiation process, we use information from the Financial Times, Bloomberg, 




   
6 
 
1. Theoretical Framework 
 
 This chapter presents the theoretical framework of this thesis, necessary to build the 
argument that the increase in legal complexity of the EU financial regulation legislation 
comes as a consequence of competing national preferences in financial market regulation and 
understanding of the role of financial services in a society. It is divided in three parts: first, it 
presents the dominant paradigms of interpreting various processes of financial market 
harmonization, integration and regulation in the EU; second, it zooms-in on the three 
theoretical building blocks of this paper and finally concludes with a case for interpreting and 
measuring legal complexity.  
1.1 Competing paradigms  
 European Union is the largest and most influential project of its sort in the world, 
therefore it is no surprise that it is also the most scientifically scrutinized integration in the 
world (Wallace, Pollack and Young, 2010). Many theories have been put forward to explain 
different aspect of this integration, drafted by political scientist, economists, theorist of 
international relations. Some of these theories have, naturally, found their way into the field 
of financial harmonization, integration and regulation, while others came as a consequence of 
adaptation of these theories to that respective field. It is possible to classify these theories 
according to the actors they tend to put at the forefront – member states, EU governing bodies 
or private actors (Quaglia, 2010). In turn, we will present each. 
 The theory that tends to put member states as the key actors in decision-making in the 
financial regulation and integration and which is probably the most dominant one nowadays 
is intergovernmentalism. In general, the intergovernmentalist argument says that the 
European union integration comes as a consequence of different bargaining powers of 
member states with stronger or weaker positions. The outcome is determined by the 
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differences in their preferences, which makes them put forward their own interests first and 
try to shape the common policies as close as possible to their own (Ruse, 2010). 
Intergovernmentalist theories emerged as an answer to the predominant (neo)functionalist 
paradigm, during the 1970s (Mazey and Laffan, 2006) when it became obvious that this 
theory lacks enough explanatory power to explain somewhat weakening position of the joint 
European bodies (Moga, 2017). Intergovernmentalism suggests that due to conflicting 
preferences and individual interests of member states often leads to decision-making 
deadlocks, since the sides are not easily willing to cede and back down from their own 
priorities. Such conflicting positions then lead to suboptimal outcomes, among which the 
most famous is the joint-decision trap (Falkner, 2011). European governing bodies noticed 
that early on the EU formation process, therefore tried numerous different approaches to 
decision and lawmaking, among which the most important one for this paper is Lamfalussy 
process4. The theory suggests that member state could show relatively high level of 
cooperation on certain issues that do not violate their sovereignty in matters they see as 
national priorities; however, in certain respects such as foreign policy for example (Keohane 
and Hoffmann, 1991), those negotiations could be potentially very difficult and often in vain. 
Literature confirms high explanatory power of intergovernmentalism on financial regulation 
and integration of the EU (Sadeh, 2009). Apart from Story and Walter (1997), our first 
theoretical building block, we ought to mention Underhill (1997), as another author who 
understood the importance of triangle UK-France-Germany for improvement and 
harmonization of the common market in financial services. Intergovernmentalism is the main 
theory that supports this paper – we show that in the creation of MiFID II and the increase in 
complexity, the main factors that drive the process are member states and that the final 
outcome is a compromise shaped by competing interests of those most important ones. 
                                                 
4 Lamfalussy process will be scrutinized further in the following chapters 
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Having large and important financial sectors, old (pre-2004) member states are more 
interested and have high bargaining power in this issue, while the member states that joined 
later have either negligible proportion of financial services in their GDP or this sector is 
dominated by foreign companies and are therefore not interested as much as the key states, or 
their interests are well represented by some of the coalitions. This is supported with our data 
as well – only Latvia, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland have answered to the 
Commission’s call for initial consultation, while most of the responses were rather short, 
comparing to the key member states5. 
 Another important theory, already mentioned in this paper, is the (neo)functionalist 
theory, used to explain the EU financial integrative processes. Arising from functionalism of 
David Mitrany (1966), Neofunctionalism applied to European Union predicted that due to the 
spillover effects from initial integration in technical and economic matters that benefited 
everyone, gradual political convergence will take place, resulting in ever-closer Union. In 
time, governments and peoples will lose their political allegiance to their national 
governments and will shift focus to joint bodies in phrasing and determining their common 
goals and policies (Haas and Dinan, 2004). This will, ipso facto, increase the importance of 
supranational bodies, surpassing individual governments and will help overcome their 
diverging preferences. As for the spillover effect, we could notice a twofold result. Firstly, 
there is a sectoral spillover – from early coal and steel agreements, to agriculture or other 
different economic agreements and second – a political spillover, which often led to 
centralization of governing bodies and committees, intended to facilitate decision-making 
processes (Moga, 2009). Applying this theory to financial integration of the EU, most 
scientists put emphasis on spillovers from the single market and European monetary 
integration (Howarth and Quaglia, 2016), with the EU commission as the main driver of 
                                                 
5 Database is to be found at: https://circabc.europa.eu/faces/jsp/extension/wai/navigation/container.jsp  
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those changes (Quaglia, 2010; Jabko, 2006; Posner, 2005). The financial crisis did put the 
member states more together and has certainly increased the potential and the willingness to 
cooperate and give a firm, harmonized answer against the crisis. Developments in the 
European Banking Union, as well as initiatives for European Capital Market Union are some 
concrete steps which have been taken in order to father harmonize and integrate the common 
financial services market. Legislation has been produced in other areas as well, namely with 
previously weakly overseen derivatives on the OTC basis, which must have had certain 
influence on MiFID II, due to the similarities of the instruments and the markets they cover. 
Although the European Commission does have an immense influence and did initiate the start 
of the MiFID revision, we argue that the length, the scope, the time needed to adopt the 
MiFID II text (especially in the European Council, where member states preferences are best 
scrutinized), the number of provisions and other questions, significantly impede the 
explanatory power of this theory, although it is not without contribution to understanding the 
MiFID II decision-making.  
 There is another group of theories, that tend to focus on private actors as the key 
determinants of EU financial integration (Quaglia, 2010). Bieling (2003) , using neo-
Gramscian approach, talks about the transnational corporations as the key influence on the 
development of harmonized markets for securities, which leads to growth but could aggravate 
social divisions and initiate a wide European discussion on societal needs and necessities. He 
finds that interests of different powerful players are converging towards a big, harmonized 
market, which in turn pushes forward different regulatory and integrative processes in its 
favor. Similar approach is taken by Macartney (2011). In his book, he, like many others, 
scrutinizes Germany, the UK and France, trying to dismiss path-dependency as the sole 
reason for national preferences, while toing down the approach of VOC which overestimates 
the focus on the state. The main message of his work is that while there is a growing 
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transnational factor that influences EU integration, it is not yet detached from the “national”, 
and therefore creates a plethora of different, variegated approaches. Unlike Bieling, 
Grossman (2004) dismisses claims of ubiquitous and omnipotent influence of private interest 
groups in the EU, contrasting the dominant belief both in academia and the public. Focusing 
on financial enterprises in France, Germany and the UK (again corroborating the influence of 
these three member states) he finds that these actors are often unable to act in utility-
maximizing manner, due to the ever changing political climate in which they cannot easily 
operate and formulate their preferences. Therefore, they cling on to political actors they know 
the best – their respective member states and corresponding national authorities, and try to, in 
accordance with them, put forward their preferences. Due to high level of uncertainty and 
gradual learning, the economic interest groups seem rather conservative and not overly 
enthusiastic about changes, which bring costs and potential hindrances in the operation. 
Knowing this, they would either push for a complete harmonization and integration with as 
few steps as possible, or they will entrench themselves, trying to influence policies that aim to 
preserve status quo. As for the EU institutions, the author finds that for these companies, 
making alliances and influencing the European Commission seems natural and relatively 
easily achievable, after the initial learning process is finished, due to the, inter alia, small 
number of actors and relatively certain policy goals. Mügge (2006) reinforces the argument of 
the strength of big players in the European market, being another author that dismisses state-
centric approaches to EU financial integration and liberalization. He finds that the regulatory 
and integrative polices are an outcome of bitter fight for influence between companies are 
interested parties in the conflict, that seek competitive advantages in the market, or at least to 
be spared from potential disadvantages. Again, using examples of the three most important 
member states, through case study of European securities in the 1990s, he demonstrates how 
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regulatory and liberalization outcomes are results of different dynamics that underpin public-
private relations.  
 Acknowledging certain explanatory power of the two other ideas, our paper is written 
almost entirely within the intergovernmentalist theory, and this theory, applied through our 
building-block system, is expected to bring the highest explanatory gains in this research.  
1.2 The three theoretical building blocks 
 The first building block of this paper is the “Political Economy of Financial 
Integration in Europe: The Battle of the Systems”, a seminal book by Jonathan Story and Ingo 
Walter (1997). Although written exactly 20 years ago, when a legislative act such as MiFID II 
was a rather wishful thinking, the book is still very relevant, clearly showing how EU 
financial regulation is shaped by differences in national preferences of its biggest and most 
influential member states, namely the UK, France and Germany. In turn, their differences 
stem from the way they see financial services and position of financial institutions in a society 
and its relationship with industry, owing a lot to the way those institutions developed over the 
course of time6. The authors think that the (then) current and future EU financial regulation 
will gradually converge towards one common point, which will be the result of a long battle 
of those different systems. At the time of the writing, it seemed that the gradual convergence 
is modeled after the UK financial system, although Germany seemed very reluctant to allow 
for it to happen.   
 The second building block of this paper is of newer date (2010), an article written by 
an Italian academic, Lucia Quaglia – “Completing the Single Market in Financial Services: 
The Politics of Competing Advocacy Coalitions”. Using advocacy coalition framework, and 
acknowledging the theory of intergovernmentalism of Story & Walter, Quaglia sets out to 
                                                 
6 The term often used today to describe those differences in political economy is Varieties of Capitalism (VOC). 
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discover were there any coalitions created during the enactment of the original MiFID (and 
one more politically controversial Directive), while adding a layer of its own. That layer 
asserts that, even though these coalitions are clearly known to exist, they do not necessarily 
form around bare economic interests. Instead, they might be the result of a shared belief 
system (“ideas”) (Quaglia, 2010; p.1009), that does not only include the governments of 
member states, but also within those member states, including a wide array of actors, both 
private and public, that can also group with other actors of similar beliefs from other member 
states or EU actors.  Where this paper borrows from Quaglia the most is her identification of 
two dominant coalitions that were in place during the creation of the original MiFID – the 
“Market-making” and “Market-shaping” coalition. The United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Scandinavian countries, Netherlands and Luxembourg belong to the former, while France, 
Belgium, Southern European countries and somewhat reluctant Germany form the latter 
coalition. The coalitions are formed around how capitalism and markets are understood and 
perceived in those societies – the market-making coalition echoes the proverbially 
competitive, individualistic and regulatory-sceptic system of the UK, always suspicious 
towards a greater role of the state in a free market economy. On the other hand, states with 
stronger leftist traditions, such as France and Italy, with almost anecdotal German fondness of 
rules, and southern states with undeveloped capital markets, form the market-shaping 
coalition. Quaglia gave a great contribution (often with David Howarth) to understanding EU 
financial integration. 
Last, but not least, the third building block, that gave a direct inspiration for this paper, 
was a chapter written by Zdeněk Kudrna “Financial market regulation: A ‘Lamfalussy exit’ 
from the joint-decision trap” in The EU's Decision Traps: Comparing Policies (2011, ed. by 
Gerda Falkner). What Kudrna did was to try to assess the benefits of Lamfalussy procedure 
by directly comparing two directives with similar intentions, although much different in scope 
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– the ISD and the original MiFID, of which former was created long before the introduction 
of the procedure. Even though objectives of Kudrna’s work do not exactly match those of this 
paper, the comparative methodology and the subject of his case study directly influenced the 
choice of case study of this thesis.   
1.3 Views on legal complexity  
  
 We have previously mentioned that, with the matters of EU legal complexity and 
potential ways of putting a quantitative expression on it, we will deal with deeper 
considerations. It is important to stress that, due to the scope, topic and intentions of this 
paper as a piece of political economy analysis, we do not intend to get involved into elusive 
and complicated legal debates on a matter which has not been unanimously resolved in the 
sphere of legal science. Nonetheless, since this matter is of great importance and one of the 
key features of this paper, we will briefly present different arguments and views on the 
measuring of legal complexity, after which we will conclude the theoretical framework 
chapter by building our case for using article length as a way of measuring complexity. 
 One striking fact is of extreme importance to our discussion – to this date, there has 
not been a single, unanimously accepted and quantitatively testable theoretical way of testing 
legal complexity (Ruhl and Katz, 2015). In fact, there has not been much literature about it to 
begin with. Notion such as legal complexity is often invoked in policy debates, by those who 
must abide by the law, or those who must supervise it. Therefore, it is clear to understand how 
proposing a measure to decrease a complexity of a legislative act is of yet the same difficulty. 
Measuring legal complexity is not the only problem – monitoring it proves to be as elusive as 
measuring. However, it would not be honest to assume that nobody tried to tackle this issue in 
a theoretical manner, or tried to build some kind of framework upon which it could be 
possible to establish some sort of theoretical framework. Of relatively recent date, there has 
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been a discipline called “complexity science” (or complexity theory) (Ruhl, 2008), which 
precisely tries to deal with these sorts of issues, using different tools that became available 
with the digital age, to facilitate the creation of a quantitative metrical system.  
 However, it seems that discovery of a theoretical way to tackle the issue of legal 
complexity remains elusive, at least without using an empirical approach. Ruhl and Katz 
(2015) propose a “yardstick” which is to be used when measuring the complexity of the US 
legal tax code. Among possible ways to measure this complexity empirically, they propose a 
few reasonable options: measuring the complexity of the Tax code by measuring how much 
time and money is required to comply with the new law, in comparison with the old one; or, 
measuring the complexity of the new software used to calculate the tax liability in comparison 
with the old software – a proxy measure, since there are several ways of measuring IT 
complexity, for example using syntax; or, measuring “readability” of a law (Morrison, 2014); 
or the number of different special provisions, especially in terms of scope and exemptions.  
 Here, we start building our case for using article length as a way of measuring legal 
complexity. We have clearly established that there is no single, unanimously accepted way of 
measuring legal complexity, at least not in a theoretical way. Therefore, we appeal not to the 
positivistic way of interpretation of our intention, but to the principle of falsifiability – using 
article length as a method of measuring legal complexity is just as legitimate way of 
measurement as is the next one – it has not been refuted by the legal scholarship. In other 
words, our method is yet another approach in a relatively unexplored dimension, whose 
results might reveal potential benefits and shortcomings and provide future guidance on how 
to proceed with the issue of theoretical legal complexity measurement. Empirically, we have 
two aforementioned “yardsticks” – ISD and the original MiFID. Kudrna (2011) already used 
such principle of comparison, when he tried to put forward the argument of Lamfalussy 
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process bypassing the joint-decision trap. Katz and Bommarito, in trying to develop a way to 
measure the United States code, state the following:  
 “Observed legal complexity may be driven by a genuine effort to keep pace with 
ongoing developments in society. Alternatively, it may only be the by-product of politicians’ 
efforts to deliver particularized benefits to specific individuals or interest groups7” (Katz and 
Bommarito II, 2013, p. 4) 
 The argument above is exactly the one that we have been trying to put forward with 
this thesis – legal complexity, measured as an increase in article length (wordcount) in the EU 
financial market regulation, concretely MiFID II, comes as an attempt by the lawmaker to 
satisfy a multitude of interests and preferences of different members states. The lawmaker 
succeeds in reaching a compromise that moves the issue beyond status quo, but at a cost of 
raising complexity, which in turn causes increases in, above else, compliance costs, but also 
leads to differences in interpretation (Baratta, 2014) which national authorities tend to use to 
their advantage to protect their own markets and market participants and lower their own 
adaptation costs. Therefore, being aware of potential limitations of our approach, we firmly 








                                                 
7 Underlined by author 
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2. Literature Review  
 
This chapter presents the main literature and sources used during the writing of this 
paper. We have already mentioned the three building-blocks that this paper is constructed 
upon. We will briefly, in turn, present each three. Furthermore, we will present the main 
works we used to understand and expand our knowledge on our case study. We conclude the 
chapter by referring to key sources of data from which we extract the necessary information, 
in order to test the two hypotheses stated in the introduction. 
2.1 Literature on MiFID 
 
In writing on MiFID, as well as gaining a nice, comprehensive overview, a book by 
Casey and Lannoo (2009) turned out to be indispensable, although read with caution, due to 
affiliation of its authors with the Commission. Calling the original MiFID, a “revolution”, the 
authors wrote during the outbreak of financial crisis, when the effects of MiFID were not easy 
to gauge, due to its short existence and crisis effects, that were already visible in Europe. 
Furthermore, being a Directive, it took some time for Member States to transpose it into their 
national laws, which most of the states did with hesitation and not without a warning from the 
Commission. Authors find the Lamfalussy procedure a success, enabling the enactment of 
MiFIDs highly technical provisions in a smooth and less politicized way, though not 
completely void of influx of national politics. MiFID revolutionized the market structure – by 
introducing an entire new universe of trade execution and transaction reporting, but also 
abolishing concentration rules, setting a level-playing field for trading venues and striking a 
decisive blow to national monopolies. Praising the improvement in harmonization and 
liberalization of the EU-wide financial markets, the authors find MiFID as a valuable measure 
that increased investor protection, influenced and enabled further technical development and 
significantly lowered cost of capital, while strengthening competition in the process. Another 
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upside of MiFID was the increase in transparency and classification and standardization of 
EU financial products, which became more available to retail clients, while protecting them 
from a long list of market abuses and misconducts of investment firms and other financial 
institutions. Though claiming that MiFID did react to the crisis in a fairly constructive way, 
the authors do admit its inefficiencies, such as substantial possibilities for gold-platting, 
fragmentation of the market, liquidity problems, dark-pools and over-the-counter transactions. 
Further consolidation of firms, due to the compliance costs, severe decrease in OTC opacity, 
growing presence of algorithmic trading and other are some of the correct predictions made 
by the authors, anticipating MiFID II.  
However, before the book press even cooled down, the talks on MiFID review started, 
as many of its flaws became clearer (vis-à-vis, inter alia, investor protection and conflict of 
interest) and as the crisis advanced deeper into the EU financial markets, causing banking and 
eventually sovereign debt crisis. A good starting point in understanding the possible 
directions of the review was “MiFID 2.0: Casting New Light on Europe’s Capital Markets” 
by CEPS (2011). Again, read with caution, the main added value of this piece lies in the fact 
that in its creation, participation was taken by a plethora of market participants, thus giving a 
perspective previously unattained, due to the low penetrative power of practitioners into the 
academia. The book was neatly divided into three main spheres of discussion – transparency, 
market structure and provision of investment services, proving essential in understanding 
contested issues among those core areas. Furthermore, the views on several key issues were 
often differing between the authors, who did not opt for a balanced, “we agree to disagree” 
approach, but decided to present all of the angles, enabling the readers to understand what 
issues were at stake and thus giving valuable guidance in conducting research on MiFID 
review. Authors clearly anticipate a more prescriptive approach of the new legislation, in line 
with the G20 financial crisis meeting conclusions.  
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A truly impressive endeavor by Busch and Ferrarini (2017) – “Regulation of the EU 
Financial Markets: MiFID II and MiFIR” was unavoidable in gaining a comprehensive view 
on the seemingly impregnable MiFID II package.  Written from a judicial point of view, due 
to the legal background of its authors, the book juxtaposes legislative provisions of both 
MiFIDs and provides a comprehensive evolution of those legal documents. Apart from 
helping with navigating through complex issues of financial technology, this book was yet 
another source of inspiration and guidance in trying to pinpoint the main issues of 
contestation between various member states, revealing differences in national preferences. 
The book devoted an entire section, quite deservingly, to problems of supervision and 
enforcement, predicting and anticipating the potential problems of the MiFID II package. 
Naming financial crisis as the main culprit that caused the MiFID review, Busch finds that the 
increase in costs due to new package provisions are justified by the social costs incurred 
otherwise, in the lack of product transparency and marketing misconduct. As for the 
introduction of the “independent advice”, a new provision previously unattained in MiFID, 
authors agree with the direction of the intention of the lawmaker, but show some reserves 
towards the true definition of “independent”. On the issue of inducements, authors give 
valuable insight into what were the preferences of different member states and how difficult 
the negotiations were, singling out Dutch gold-platting intentions. Finally, this book helped in 
understanding one political and one technical issue were agreement was either difficult to 
achieve or was not even made. Third-country access seems to have been one of the most 
contested problems during the negotiations, a problem of a longer date, previously not 
resolved in the original MiFID. Even though MiFID II package did take a lot of discretionary 
power from the member states, it still required a good deal of compromising, which, 
according to Busch and Louisse, resulted in an overly complex solution, short of full 
harmonization. In the area of high frequency trading (HFT), a very contested issue in business 
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circles (not only in Europe), member states will continue to be allowed to have their own 
policy towards it, which will probably result in HFT being banned in some member states, 
creating sub-optimal solutions in terms of harmonization intended. Finally, MiFID II was also 
analyzed in the context of Brexit.  
 As for understanding different provisions of both MiFIDs, a bulk of relevant 
academic journals and other literature was used.  One of the key authors who devoted much 
of her time to legal and political consequences of the MiFIDs is Niamh Moloney, a professor 
at London School of Economics. Professor Moloney observes lack of academic attention for 
retail investors, to which she devotes several works (see Moloney, 2005). Moloney also 
devoted a lot of her research to the shift in the understanding of EU market regulation, by 
changing the agenda from liberalization to prescription, as a mean to answer the crisis and 
centralize and harmonize decision-making in EU financial regulation see (Moloney, 2011; 
2010). An article of great importance in understanding the political economy of the MiFID 
review, Moloney and Ferrarini (2012) shows the relevance and importance of equities in 
national preferences and depicts a bitter battle between regulated markets and 
OTC/brokerage, which continued well into the MiFID II package, although with further 
nuances and complexities, echoing the market evolution since the original MiFID.  Article 
also discuss the position of different EU regulatory bodies and most important member states. 
Finally, Moloney’s overview of EU financial regulation (EU Securities and Financial 
Markets Regulation, 2014) proved valuable in filling some blanks in knowledge of legal 
issues.   
Being so over-encompassing in its effects, it is natural that many other authors dealt 
with different provisions of MiFID in depth. Inducements (Papaconstantinou, 2016), 
algorithmic trading and HFT (Busch, 2016)), market fragmentation (Gentile and Fioravanti, 
2011), effects of MiFID on EU capital markets (Panagopoulos, Chatzigagios and Dokas, 
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2015), effects on private law (Busch, 2017); trade transparency (Hautcœur, Lagneau-Ymonet 
and Riva, 2010; Majois, 2008; Ferrarini and Wymeersch, 2009); investment research 
(O'Halloran, 2015); instrument complexity (Vandenbroucke, 2013),  compliance costs 
(Musile Tanzi et al., 2013; Prorokowski, 2015) and other. 
2.2 Literature on EU financial market integration   
  
 One big chunk of literature devoted to the EU financial market integration (in general) 
and its regulation (in specific) came within the last few years from Lucia Quaglia and David 
Howarth. Those two authors, writing either independently, or collaborating with each other or 
other academics, gave immense contribution in understanding European financial integration. 
Their area of interest includes, but is not limited to, post-crisis reforms, European Banking 
Union, European Capital Markets Union, sovereign debt crisis, Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, European Monetary Union and other8. The authors mostly dealt with issues of 
political economy, public policy and European governance, trying to explain what 
mechanisms drive and what obstacles stand in the way of full harmonization in the common 
market in financial services. Of particular value is the amount of data collected “off-the-
work”, dealing with sensitive political issues, where member states do not want to reveal their 
national preferences in public, and where the sources of data do not come from academia. 
Despite the fact that authors did not deal with MiFID II in great depth9, Quaglia’s work on 
MiFID I and their work on the issues mentioned above do provide valuable guidelines in 
understanding how the biggest and most important member states see the European market 
integration. Authors also have, on several occasions, pointed out the importance of the EU 
presidency of a member state; that comes especially important when a member state presiding 
has strong financial sectors and tends to use its presidency to influence certain policy 
                                                 
8 See “References” in Howarth and Quaglia (2016) for their full bibliography. 
9 Email correspondence between Lucia Quaglia and the author  
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decisions (Ft.com, 2017). Division between the North and South of the EU, that causes 
different views of the common currency, fiscal policy, supervisory mechanisms, sovereign 
debt, competition and protection and other themes are also often explored by Howarth and 
Quaglia.  
 We deal with different theories of EU financial integration and the role of member 
states, EU bodies and other actors with deeper consideration in the Theoretical framework 
chapter, while here we briefly present other valuable papers and insightful theories.  
Grossman and Leblond, acknowledging an improvement in integration (2011), call for 
caution, claiming that integration is still lagging behind regulation. O Broin (2012) examines 
the role of the EU Parliament in financial market integration in the EU and the level of 
responsiveness to the crisis. Blavoukos and Pagoulatos (2008) are interested in bargaining 
and negotiations of member states. Bieling et al (2015) advocate an alternative, regulation 
theory approach. Colaert (2015) notices blurring lines between three core areas of finance – 
banking, securities and insurance, and analyzes EU financial regulation and supervision in 
light of the need to acknowledge those changes. One interesting account of MiFID review, 
and, broadly, place of securities and regulated markets in the EU, treats market information as 
public good (Lagneau-Ymonet and Riva, 2012), advocating a stronger presence of regulated 
markets, claiming that private information and opaqueness will ultimately lead to another 
crisis. Finally, a lot has been written recently about interactions of (soon-to-be) non-EU and 
EU actors, with Brexit (De la Pena, 2016) and EU-USA comparison often in focus (Bošković, 
Cerruti and Noël, 2010). US financial system is often seen as an ideal of harmonized and 
integrated market, a role which it fulfils with more success and less costs than the EU.  
2.3 Sources of data 
 
 As we have already mentioned, the secretive nature of the data necessary to build up a 
case on national preferences of EU member states, and due to the constraints in accessing 
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officials of member states (ministries of finance, NCAs or central banks), we have opted for a 
different approach, using 2010 EU Commission MiFID review proposal and the responses 
from national authorities10, as well as European Council progress reports during Danish and 
Cypriot presidency (ECOFIN 11536, 2012; ECOFIN 16523/12). After initiation of public 
debate on MiFID revision, in December 2011, different market participants were given a bit 
less than two months to provide its stance on different aspects of the revision, most of which 
is publicly available. We have decided to focus exclusively on responses from governing 
bodies of member states (Section “National authorities) due to two simple reasons -  the 
nature of the topic, which sees member states as key actors and length constraints of this 
paper11. Some of the member states, such as France or Germany, sent their opinion on MiFID 
review from several bodies; however, no relevant differences in preferences are found.  Some 
countries did not provide (or it was not made public) an answer to the consultation paper, 
among which Luxembourg stands out as an important country with a high proportion of 
financial services in the GDP. 
 Therefore, what we have as a primary source of data is, in two words – starting 
position, of the Commission and of the member states in the Council (ECOFIN). It is 
important to stress that we are most certainly aware of potential difficulties of this approach – 
mainly that the official preferences were not truly stated due to the public nature of these 
consultations. Noteworthy is that in those days, expectations of both general public and 
professionals, almost everywhere in the world, were aimed at politicians, seeking from them 
the resolution of crisis and implementation of new regulatory measures. Therefore, if any 
country had certain reserves towards stronger regulation, it could have hesitated to reveal 
them to the public. In 2011, parliamentary or general elections were held in Denmark, Spain, 
                                                 
10 Commission, Public Consultation. Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (the Commission 
2010 Consultation). Database of responses is to be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2010/mifid_en.htm.  
11 That does not mean, however, that other actors had no or limited influence in decision-making – the City had 
several lobby groups focused on MiFID II. 
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Sweden and Ireland, to name a few most important member states, which could have 
produced not only political conflict, but also raise issues of legitimacy (mandate). Moreover, 
in some countries, like Germany, banking sector is divided into two camps – two biggest 
banks (Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank, as worldwide players) on one side, and coalition 
of smaller banks on the other (Howarth and Quaglia, 2010). There could have been some 
other, more trivial problems, such as lack of enough time to properly asses the revision (less 
than 2 months12). Finally, it is indicative that the format and the length of the responses differ 
drastically between member states – the former could have been due to politically skillful way 
of avoiding answering sensitive questions (the questions not answered are also valuable as 
indication that sometimes tells much) while the former could be explained by lack of interest 
of countries not very famous as exporters of financial services. Nonetheless, having all that in 
mind, we firmly believe that these documents present a par excellence source for determining 
initial member state preferences. By complementing this information with insiders such as 
Financial Times or The Economist (and different academics), above all to fill information 
lacunae for the negotiations on Level 1 measures, we feel certain that accurate representation 
of true member state preferences will be achieved 
 Finally, the ultimate and indispensable source of information for this case study will 







                                                 
12 And also, the fact that responses had to be sent around the transition months between two years.   
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3. Methodology and research hypotheses  
 
 This chapter provides a brief overview of methodology that we will use in order to 
tackle the research hypotheses in question. The methodology builds upon assumptions 
previously stated in theoretical framework and is a combination of rather simple and 
straightforward quantitative methods, to which we will provide a qualitative explanation 
within the framework of political economy.  
 3.1 Data overview 
 
 To follow and compare increase in legal complexity between two version of MiFID, 
but also within the same version (Commission proposal – Council proposal – Final solution), 
we rely heavily on the original documents (Commission 652/413; Council 11006/1314). 
Tackling a growth in complexity between two version of document of MiFID could be a good 
starting strategy, but the bias of the crisis and the heavy increase in overall scope might skew 
any conclusion we could infer from that. Therefore, in order to follow the increase in legal 
complexity due to potential meddling and disagreements of member states that come as a 
result of differing preferences, we have decided to follow the evolution of the document from 
the European Commission, through the Council to the final approved version. The documents 
in question are the Commission 2011 proposal, the Council 2013 proposal and the final 
version approved in the spring of 2014. The data collection was severely impeded by the 
provisional character of the first two documents, since they were proposal that were planned 
to be amended in the first place. Some articles were completely missing by the time they 
reached final Directive, some being incorporated, while others being completely discarded. 
Some articles changed names. We encountered serious difficulties while collecting 
information from the initial Commission proposal (101 article), due to the fact that entire 
                                                 
13Available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/isd/mifid/COM_2011_656_en.pdf  
14Available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011006%202013%20INIT  
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articles were crossed out, making the proposal rather unintelligible. Nonetheless, main traits 
were captured, and the crossing served as yet another insight to the intentions of the 
lawmaker. The proposal made by the Council in 2013 (100 articles) is completely legible, but 
it was made almost two years after the initial proposal and after numerous sessions and 
discussions. The final MiFID II Directive has 97 articles15. 
 To tackle the second hypothesis that, due to flow of time in “living” under the 
common regime, the convergence that took place made some provisions obsolete and 
redundant, which should be reflected in substantial decrease of word count of an article, or 
the entire regulatory chapter. The main source of data for testing the second hypothesis is the 
correlation table given in the Annex IV of the MiFID II Directive document, that shows what 
articles from the original MiFID are being repealed by which provisions from the new 
package (articles that repeal the old Directive are to be found in both MiFID II and MiFIR). 
The correlation table features a total of 369 correlating comparisons, some of which go into 
depth (provision by provision) while others compare article. To our surprise, the correlation 
table features as much as 28 provisions that are not present in the original MiFID document. 
After going through original and amended version of MiFID I, including browsing it in 
several languages, we were unable to discover those provisions. There were nowhere to be 
found neither in scientific literature nor in financial magazines. Therefore, we have decided to 
exclude those provision from the calculations. Other provisions whose repeal was not 
accounted for were provision of legal nature, with no relation to the content of the Directive. 
Due to enormous quantity of provisions that were paired, we will only analyze the ones that 
show the biggest difference in magnitude of the change, either being positive (more text) or 
negative (less text). The latter are indicative for the second hypothesis, while the former 
                                                 
15 Directive 2014/65/EU can be found at:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0065&from=EN  
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provide an overview of the regulatory evolution, but due to many factors (i.e. crisis, as we 
mentioned) will not be enough to provide us with unbiased information. 
 Finally, we are basing our conclusion upon the data grouped in two different 
comparison tables – one made by the author (COM-CON-MiFID II), while the other is the 
tables slightly modified by the other, which can be found in MiFID II Annex IV. Both 
documents are to be found in the Appendices section of this paper.  
 3.2 Hypothesis 1 – more complexity due to conflicting 
preferences  
 
 Based on the theory that conflicting member state preferences on key regulatory issues 
cause these member states to influence regulatory bodies in order to produce legal acts that 
are as close as possible to their national legislative systems, and that these conflicts create 
final provisions that are lengthy and elusive compromises, we construct an argument, a 
research hypothesis, that provisions which are politically sensitive and heavily debated during 
negotiations, tend to be, on average, lengthier in the final document, than they were in the 
initial proposal. It is perfectly clear that initial Commission proposal, made almost three years 
before the final solution, will have to be heavily amended. However, if the theory holds, those 
articles will be, on average, longer than those that were not heavily politically debated. The 
potential problems we see with this methodology is the influence of the European Parliament 
legislative bargaining, which has significantly increased since the crisis started (Moloney, 
2012). We plan to control for that influence by following the evolution of the legislative 
proposals from the Commission through the Council – if there was substantial increase of 
length in the Council, but not (as) much between Council proposal and final solution, the 
influence of the Parliament was clearly not decisive. Due to the high number of provisions 
and provisional character of proposals (which we addressed already in this chapter), we were 
not able to group provisions with provisions – we grouped articles. This does create a bit less 
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preciseness than if it were to be done otherwise. However, this problem can be addressed 
either consulting with literature and financial magazines (some provisions were heavily 
debated and therefore are relatively well-addressed in the sources). Another issue worth 
explaining is the decision to use only MiFID II Directive for comparison, but not MiFIR. 
Being a Regulation (MiFIR), its provisions automatically apply to all member states without 
the need for national transposition. Therefore, the room for compromise was not large and the 
full harmonization of such decision would not be made on contested issues. Furthermore, 
sources suggest that there was no significant debate on MiFIR provisions – at least not as 
much as in the case of MiFID II. The very nature of MiFIR – it is dealing mainly with 
technical provisions such as data management, transaction reporting and other, clearly shows 
that it is addressing the issues with less political weight. Finally, MiFIR does not allow for 
gold-platting, and possibilities for gold-platting is exactly what we are looking for to 
discover. In other words – MiFIR comparison would not tell us much; what it would do is 
harm the scope and the length of this thesis without providing substantial insights.  
 Finally, in order for the theoretical assumption to have predictive, as well as 
explanatory power, we will here state what key provisions we are hoping to find as 
disproportionately lengthier in relation to their proposal predecessors. Upon meticulously 
reviewing the literature, we have decided that the provisions that we are looking for will be 
those related to OTFs, third-country regime, clearing (especially access discrimination), 
inducements, publication of sanctions and provisions related to commodity derivatives16. 
Therefore, the stated first hypothesis is: 
 
                                                 
16 For more information see : Busch and Ferrarini (2017); Moloney (2010, 2011, 2014); ECOFIN progress 
reports 11536/12 and 16523/12; FT and the Economist articles in the literature review at the end. 
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H1: Articles related to the issues stated above will be, on average, lengthier in the final 
MiFID Directive, than other provisions that did not cause conflict of member state 
preferences.  
3.3 Hypothesis 2 – decrease in length due to convergence  
 
 Original MiFID was introduced in 2004 – the MiFID II package was approved in 
2014. Since the application period for MiFID one started on 2007, that gave seven years to 
markets of member states to gradually implement the Directive into their national legislation. 
Therefore, a common wisdom might suggest that, since the initial MiFID was a 
harmonization of previously unprecedented scale, that the new MiFID did not have to face 
such groundbreaking changes. Moreover, since the increase of number of provisions and the 
scope of the new MiFID is likely to bring only increase in length, a potential decrease could 
easily lead us to assume that some waivers, exemptions and exceptions made have been 
abolished due to convergence of financial and regulatory systems. While the added value of 
the first hypothesis probably lies in its quantitative part, the potential added value of this 
hypothesis lies in an argument that has not been put through in the literature so far. Due to the 
enormous increase in scope and complexity of MiFID II, not many have talked about 
decreases due to convergence. However, anticipating possible criticism to our approach, we 
do find that there is a possibility that decrease in complexity comes as a result of some other 
factors. One that comes to our mind is abolishment of some practices due to technological 
change, which rendered certain instruments obsolete. Furthermore, this decrease might have a 
legal background, but not of same nature as the one we are inspecting – some practices might 
have become illegal in the meantime, due to the crisis. Literature does not provide us a clue 
and there is not much mention of this phenomenon – but it does not mean that it is not 
happening. Therefore, it is very difficult to predict any possible outcome – upon obtaining 
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data results, we will select several provisions that are significantly and substantially shorter in 
size (MiFID II/MiFIR provision shorter than MiFID I). Alternatively, one possible hint that 
might suggest some convergence is the shift from using a Directive (in 2004) to using a 
Regulation (MiFIR) – some provisions have experienced enough harmonization and 
convergence in practice, that they became non-controversial enough to be included in an 
effective-immediately legal instrument.  
 With regards to aforementioned we state the second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Due to the convergence that came as a consequence of the effect of gradual 
harmonization, initiated by the original MiFID, some provisions require less exemptions, 
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4 Introduction to the case study – from ISD to MiFID 
review 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader into our case study. We will 
provide an overview of financial market integration and regulation, from the early 1990s and 
introduction of Investment Services Directive (ISD), through the original MiFID, all the way 
up to the MiFID revision, or what eventually came to be known as MiFID II. Having in mind 
the scope and the intention of this paper, we will not go into too many details and we will try 
to provide information necessary to understand the problems that MiFID revision had to face. 
 4.1 From ISD to MiFID (2004)  
 
 One of the intentions of the common market was the introduction of common market 
in financial services and gradual harmonization of financial products and practices. One 
always needs to keep in focus how difficult and time and energy consuming were early 
European integrative processes, so it is no wonder that it took around 4 years for the ISD to 
be finished (Kudrna, 2011). Even though some harmonization process did take off in the 
1980s, only as the decade approached its end, a favorable climate appeared for creation of 
such a framework. There were many incentives behind the creation of ISD, but most of them 
focused on providing such a harmonization that would lead to: increase in competition; 
establishment of a common level playing field; establishment of equal or similar conduct of 
business rules; decrease of financial opacity (both for retail and wholesale clients); increase in 
pre as well as post-trade transparency; increase in quality and quantity of liquidity; 
classification and standardization of markets; provisions related to brokerage; proliferation of 
equity financing and other (Casey and Lannoo, 2009; CEPS, 2011; Moloney, 2014).  
 Economic activity of the European markets (apart from the UK) unlike the US, was 
heavily dependent on bank-financing and much less developed in terms of equity and other 
financing that might come from securities such as bonds. Therefore, one of the main goals of 
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the ISD was to try to change it, in order to diversify means of financing, which would lower 
the cost of capital and provide further possibilities for the European SME sector. Another 
objective we mentioned was the creation of the level playing field. This was a huge problem 
and it remained as an issue during the creation of MiFID II. One investor from, say, Italy, had 
to go through thick and thin in order to be able to invest in, say, Irish financial system. This 
hypothetical Italian investor had to apply for a license in this country and to get to know all 
the specific provisions different from Italian ones. The costs, in time, energy, money and 
human capital are therefore substantial – not to mention the entry barrier, since he will be 
severely hindered by the learning process and the knowledge that the market players in 
Ireland already possess. He would be authorized by Irish national authority, which creates 
further barriers. Moreover, many countries had concentration rule in place, which meant that 
execution of stocks could be only done via national stock exchange17, which gave those 
national champions quite an advantage over other players and had been securing them a 
rather lucrative monopoly. Therefore, all the incentives behind the ISD proposal were to 
somehow create a common market which would, if not complete obliviate the national 
differences, then at least lower them to a reasonable level, which would substantially boost 
cross-border investment and provide further impetus for growth in European economies. Of 
course, given the difficulty of intended goals, the differences between the markets, political 
sensitivity of the issues in question, lack of common currency, in the times before and 
immediately after the Maastricht treaty, one does not have to be a financial genius to predict 
how successful this piece of legislation could turn out to be. 
 Creation of ISD caused bitter political tensions. Kudrna (2011) mentions three main 
issues18 during the negotiations between member states: different approaches to banks and 
investment firms in issues of competition; conduct of business rules in the domain of investor 
                                                 
17 A well know example is Bourse de Paris, a national champion in France.  
18 The second and the third arising from different preferences of member states. 
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protection and the concentration rule (competition between stock exchanges) previously 
mentioned. Fearing the race to the bottom, due to the harmonization of supervision issues that 
could lead to relocation of investment providers to countries which applied less strict rules, 
the final compromise allowed for significant opportunities for member states to gold-plat the 
initial legislation. Furthermore, southern state coalition preferred less liberalizing measures. It 
seems that the most persistent country was France – it bitterly fought with the UK, protecting 
the rights of Parisian stock exchange (Moloney and Ferrarini, 2012). Finally, in 1993, a 
compromise was made, but it proved to be a Pyrrhic victory. Certain level of harmonization 
was certainly achieved and it was a move in the right direction. However, the shortness of the 
legislative act, the vagueness of its provisions, the heavy compromises that had to be made 
and its format as a principle-based legislation, all led to strong opportunities for gold-platting, 
which was then ruthlessly used by almost every country, which in turn did not bring intended 
level of harmonization (Casey and Lannoo, 2009). Another problem was that the ISD, and 
this does not have to do much with the decision making, is that it could not keep up with the 
improvement in financial engineering (CEPS, 2011). Considering that the next document in 
the line, the original MiFID, was created eleven years later, after common currency kicked in, 
in a completely different setting, with the victory of Western capitalism and integrative 
strivings of the former Eastern bloc, it is no wonder that the ISD was long overdue and that it 
needed a brand-new legislation. However, it would not be fair not to mention that the ISD 
introduced the idea of servicing “passports”, a predecessor of the famous MiFID passports; it 
gave further guidelines and showed implementation problems that ought to be tackled in the 
MiFID proposal. While the initial intentions were to review the original ISD, it was finally 
agreed to devise a brand-new legislation, that was to be the original MiFID. The initial draft 
was proposed in 2002 (Casey and Lannoo, 2009), and it turn out to be a major harmonization 
endeavor by the European Union.  
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4.2 FSAP and Lamfalussy procedure – the MiFID context   
  
 Before going about the provisions and contested issues of the original MiFID, it is 
necessary to present the context in which it was produced and the Lamfalussy procedure 
which enabled it.  
 Being aware of the need to create a single market in financial services, encouraged by 
the creating of the European Monetary Union, the European Commission created a document 
titled Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), in 1999, which proclaimed three goals: the 
formation of single market in wholesale financial services, opening and securing retail 
markets and strengthening the prudential supervision (FSAP, 1999)19. Common market in 
securities, but also derivatives, became a must, for all those reasons we stated above, when 
we discussed the goals of ISD, whose review is called for in the document. Furthermore, the 
need for facilitation of cross-border investment services proliferation and increase and 
harmonization of supervision is required. Differing member-state regulation is seen as a high 
cost and significant hindrance in pan European activities. Finally, when it comes to 
wholesale, the FSAP calls for harmonization of accounting principles, protection and 
standardization of EU pension schemes, mutual recognition of collateral provision and 
enforcement rules and improvement of environment for cross-border restructuring (FSAP, 
1999). 
 When it comes to retail issues, the Commission recognizes that there has been less 
consideration in the past (in comparison to wholesale markets), which in turn led to all sorts 
of difficulties, which severely affected investor’s confidence in the markets. Therefore, the 
Commission is seeking a creation of a strong, European wide framework of regulation, 
related to the establishment of harmonized rules of conduct. Transparency and information 
                                                 
19 To be found at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al24210  
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availability is key to overcome fear of cross-border investors, since riskiness of such actions 
often leads to investors decision not to proceed with the investment. Furthermore, 
enforcement of rules needs to be guaranteed, again in order to boost investor’s confidence, 
knowing that whoever is willing to go about deceiving investors, will be prosecuted for these 
actions, fully protecting potential cross-border investors. Next, Commission calls for 
alignment of consumer protection rules of different member states, while the remaining 
provisions deal with matters such as electronic commerce, insurance intermediaries and cross-
border retail payments (FSAP, 1999). 
 Finally, remaining provisions deal with regulatory and supervisory matters, where it is 
calling for strengthening of the regulatory framework, closer monitoring of the tendencies of 
the day, tackling the issue of capital adequacy and solvency, enhancing the monitoring and 
supervision of financial conglomerates that provide a wide set of services and products 
(banking, securities and insurance) and the creation of a common supervisory body for 
securities (FSAP, 1999).  
 All those high-level principles were sketched in the FSAP. During the next five years, 
a total number of astonishing 42 directives (Kudrna, 2011) were approved, with some of the 
most familiar being the Prospectus directive, Market Abuse Directive (MAD) and 
Transparency Directive (CEPS, 2011). However, by far the most famous and the most 
important one was the original MiFID, approved in 2004.  
 Even though the original MiFID was not the first attempt to harmonize investment 
services industry and markets in the EU, it was the first one made under the new legislative 
procedure – the “Lamfalussy procedure”20. Named after Alexandre Lamfalussy, the chairman 
of the committee who devised it, it set out to define a clear set of rules to be followed to 
facilitate and speed up the process of financial regulation lawmaking in the EU. The 
                                                 
20 Also called Lamfalussy architecture, Lamfalussy process.  
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procedure foresees four institutional levels. In the Level 1, the European Parliament and the 
Council adopt the measures which are proposed by the Commission, in a classical EU 
decision-making procedure. This level, however, is providing a general framework, sketching 
out high-level policy measures, preferably without going into too many technical details. The 
Level 2 measures are within the competency of the Commission, which empowers special 
committees, filled by EU member states representatives, whose task is to delve into technical 
measures, leaving the Parliament and the Council to deal only with matters of highly political 
importance (de Visscher, Maiscocq and Varone, 2007). Level 3 mobilizes national regulatory 
authorities, which aid the commission in “pushing” the legislation further down the regulatory 
chain, while Level 4 consists mainly in monitoring of compliance with the legal provisions. 
This technocratic procedure was first introduced in securities legislation, followed by 
provisions applied to banking, insurance, pensions and other21.  
 However, following the outbreak of financial crisis, the EU restructured the original 
procedure by creating independent supervisory authorities22, empowered by the Commission, 
that completely took over the Level 3, with a mandate to devise regulatory and implementing 
technical standards, formerly belonging to the Level 2 part. This reform, devised as crisis-
absorbing mechanism, was also supposed to further dilute the involvement of politics into the 
regulatory process.   
 The Lamfalussy procedure definitely did enhance the speed and flexibility of 
approving the new EU financial regulation, creating, faster than ever, an unprecedented 
amount of regulatory provisions, measured in thousands of pages of ITS and RTS23 text. 
However, this led to several serious practical issues that had an impact on the entire financial 
                                                 
21 https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/financial-reforms-and-their-
progress/regulatory-process-financial-services/regulatory-process-financial-services_en ;  also 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/071120_final_report_en.pdf 
22 The three European Supervisory Authorities created in 2011 (the ESAs) are – European Banking Authority 
(EBA), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA) 
23 Implementing Technical Standards and Regulatory Technical Standards, respectively. 
   
36 
 
sector, also hitting non-financial counterparties. The critics say that, due to the colossal 
increase in length and complexity, recent legal provisions in financial regulation create an 
enormous burden on the balance sheet of the companies, forcing them to allocate a lion’s 
share of its time, money and human capital to be able to comply with the new norms. 
Therefore, not only that they will have to spend millions on compliance (Ferrarini and 
Moloney, 2012), but their focus on improving business will be narrowed, potentially causing 
the shifting of costs to the end-users. Furthermore, the argument goes, such an onerous 
workload will inevitably lead to inabilities to comply with the original intentions of the 
lawmaker, while misuses and arbitrage cannot be ruled out. Finally, latest regulatory wave, 
with gigantic and all-encompassing legislative acts, will not be easy to monitor, which 
already causes headache to National Competent Authorities (NCAs24) of EU member states, 
in charge of this ungrateful duty. Even the European Union itself sometimes has to admit, 
unwillingly (Ft.com, 2015), that the scope and the demands (especially related to IT and data 
management issues) are so complex to understand and internalize, that it often postpones the 
initial implementation dates (for MiFID II, for example, the implementation date moved from 
January 3rd, 2017 to the same date a year later25).  
4.3 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004 
  
We have already mentioned how much has been written on MiFID. It is not always easy to 
avoid getting lost in its lengthy provisions and very broad scope. Therefore, it is not in our 
intention, nor is that the topic of this paper, to elaborate on the original MiFID in too much 
depth; instead, we will provide necessary information for a reader to be able to follow the 
regulatory evolution from ISD and to understand the key issues that remained in its following 
review.  
                                                 
24 Nadia Manzari, a high-ranking member of CSSF(NCA of Luxembourg) complained about increasing legal 
complexity, at ICT Spring conference on Regtech. 
25 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/18-markets-financial-instruments/ 
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 MiFID, when it was approved in 2004, was a giant leap forward in the attempts of the 
Union to harmonize its investment services and markets. Due to its length and scope, it 
created a debate without precedent, caused numerous controversies and changed financial 
market landscape in Europe forever (Economist.com, 2014). Key provisions of MiFID could 
be divided in four parts (Casey and Lannoo, 2009): client suitability and appropriateness, best 
execution policies, conflict of interest provisions and price transparency issues. We shall, in 
turn, briefly present them. 
 Introduction of client suitability and appropriateness test were one of the key measures 
aimed at significant enhancement of the investor protection. The directive brought 
classification into retail, professional and eligible counterparties (ECP). The classification 
depends of the level of knowledge of the counterparties, their asset value, experience, 
intended activity and other. Some clients can, under certain conditions, switch between the 
classifications, if they satisfy certain tests. These KYC (Know your customer) provisions 
were made to facilitate the level of protection a company is obliged to provide – a client with 
less knowledge (a retail client) must be treated differently than an ECP, which creates 
different business strategies, approaches and marketing. These provisions either did not exist 
in the ISD at all or they were not that detailed and remained largely unspecified.  
 MiFID introduced something that sparked a lot of debate and that had numerous 
different approaches in other continents and markets, like the US – the best execution policy. 
Recital 3326 says (Directive 2004/39/EC): 
 “It is necessary to impose an effective ‘best execution’ obligation to ensure that 
investment firms execute client orders on terms that are most favorable to the client27. This 
obligation should apply to the firm which owes contractual or agency obligations to the 
client.” 
                                                 
26 Mifid I original document available at:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004L0039&from=EN  
27 Underlined by the author 
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 Acknowledging that the intention of a portfolio manager is a bit difficult to quantify, 
MiFID offers other, more flexible ways of determining what is in the best interest of a client, 
in the context of its demands and guidelines, where it introduces a lot of other criteria, such as 
speed, availability, liquidity, nature of the trading venue and of the instrument and other.  
 Conflict of interest policies aimed to ensure that investment firms are taking all the 
possible and reasonable steps to ensure that there will not be a conflict of interest, or, in case 
there is a chance of having one, to inform their client about it and let the client decide on 
execution of the order. However, an investment firm must do whatever is in their power 
before consulting the client, so that client consultation is the ultimate measure, but should not 
be used with ease.  
 Finally, measures that aimed to interact with the market infrastructure is transparency. 
MiFID introduced the classification to regulated markets, Multilateral Trading Facilities 
(MTFs) and Systematic Internalizers (SI)28, effectively abolishing the concentration rule. In 
this division, the regulated markets represent what were before the national stock markets of 
EU member states, while the MTFs were new, competing platforms, that were not too 
different in the nature of operation, but with a bit less strict rules applying to the latter 
(Ferrarini and Moloney, 2012). This was intended to diversify the market, provide more 
liquidity and deconcentrate the market to avoid issues related to the systemic risk. In this way, 
a client can choose where to execute its orders, with higher pre-trade and post-trade 
transparency – both aimed to decrease the spreads, provide more liquidity, give enough 
information on volume and price and prevent market manipulation (Kudrna, 2011). However, 
this only applied to shares, while application to other instruments, such as bonds, was 
foreseen possible, but not mandatory (Ferrarini and Wymersch, 2006). 
                                                 
28 MiFID Article 4: “means an investment firm which,on an organised, frequent and systematic basis, deals on 
own account by executing client orders outside a regulated market or an MTF” 
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 Quaglia finds two main contested issues: concentration rule and adequate pre-trade 
and post-trade requirements, around which two coalitions have formed – the Northern and the 
Southern (Quaglia, 2010). The former advocated more liberalization of trading venues, 
embodied in the cancelation of the concentration rule and proliferation of trading platforms, 
while the former mainly defended the concentration rule as a mean to keep the equities 
market regulated and monitored. On the other hand, the Northern coalition advocated less 
strict and less onerous rules when it comes to trade transparency, due to its prescriptive 
nature, that influenced the market too much – in other words, it was going against their view 
on the role of the regulatory bodies in economic activity. The position of main advocate of the 
Northern coalition, the UK, and the position of the main advocate of the Southern coalition, 
France, was rather well-known. The mystery was the position of Germany, which was 
somewhere in between (Quaglia, 2010).  
 Initial consultations were put through by the Commission in late 2000; in the fall of 
2003, both documents reached European Parliament and the Council. Italian president of the 
EU Commission, Romani Prodi, used his position to influence the initial proposal, which was 
very much in line with the Southern coalition preferences. It got approved the Council, in 
October of 2003, by a sudden vote with qualified majority, a move not very usual for such 
important issues, with most of the members of the Northern coalition voting against. 
However, when the proposal went back to the EP, the UK and the UK-based American firms 
with their lobbying groups succeeded in reshaping the proposal, withdrawing many of the 
more stringent provisions, that were more in line with the Southern coalition. Finally, in the 
spring of 2004, all sides (the Commission, the EP and the Council) agreed and the MiFID was 
approved, with final provisions very similar to the wishes of the Northern coalition. 
 Finally, on 1st of November 2007, MiFID replaced the ISD, and the new era in 
European financial markets had begun.  
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5 The MiFID revision  
 
 Not long ago after the MiFID kick-started with the implementation, European 
continent found itself in the midst of the worst financial crisis in decades. Started as a 
subprime-mortgage crisis in the USA, it the world so interconnected as the world of today is, 
it quickly spread to other developed areas of the world. Collapse of the Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 showed the potential scale of disaster, with all the fundamentals plummeted 
in an unprecedented manner.  World leaders quickly gathered in 2009, on a G20 summit in 
Pittsburgh, where they discussed how to change the economic and financial landscape to 
alleviate the consequences of the crisis. Recognizing numerous malfunctions and misuses of 
modern financial system, it was stated that one of the major culprits of the crisis was financial 
opacity, in principle, and financial derivative products traded OTC, as a concrete function and 
direct consequence of the transparency. Therefore, the world leaders reached an agreement to 
propose measures which would bring as much as possible of these trades onto the trading 
platforms and venues, in order to be able to monitor financial activity and spot dangerous 
market movements on time. In relation to that, obligation of trade reporting was introduced to 
some other instruments (mainly derivatives and all sorts of structured products), while the 
reporting regime for other products got significantly stricter. The main idea was to demand 
reporting OTC derivatives to trade repositories, bringing standardized OTC contracts to 
regulated and organized trading venues and markets, clearing through central counterparties 
in order to reduce counterparty default risk, increase capital requirements for bilateral and 
other non-centrally cleared contracts and establish effective measures to oversee the 
implementation process (ECB, 2016)29. 
 
                                                 
29 More at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/eb201608_article02.en.pdf  
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 5.1 Initial Consultations 
 
 European Union, as one of the key world players, was at the forefront of the 
discussion and inception of anti-crisis measures. The MiFID regime did not have enough time 
to show its full potential and provide enough data for an assessment, but it already had to be 
changed. Although it did show significant resilience in the times of the outbreak of the crisis, 
it quickly revealed potential problems. Even though there is a distance of only several years, 
when the MiFID was approved, back in 2004, financial landscape was a completely different 
dimension. Equity markets were booming, trust among actors and in the markets, was very 
high, there were no liquidity problems. We could say that the original MiFID was a child of 
its epoch – it was a liberalizing and competition increasing package, that aimed to promote 
financial cooperation and impact growth. A few years later, when the financial institutions 
were labeled as main culprits worldwide, nobody called for further liberalization – even the 
proverbially competitive, US public, called for more regulation, more transparency and less 
opacity (Dodd-Frank, 2010)30. Furthermore, due to the massive collapses and the need for 
bailouts of big American and European banks, there was a major mistrust and investors were 
very skeptical to move their capital – instead, they started hoarding it and looking for safe 
investments, buying American and German government bonds. In the world of quick and 
substantial progress of financial products, a legislative act such as MiFID is always doomed 
to be late – by the time it passes complicated and lengthy lawmaking procedure, some of its 
measure already become either obsolete or they do not account for progress in the meantime. 
Having all that in mind, European Commission initiated consultation process in the middle of 
2010, drafted a Consultation paper and published it in December 2010, calling for member 
states and all other stakeholders to send their responses to the proposal (Commission, 2010).  
                                                 
30 More at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004L0039&from=EN  
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 The prelude to this Commission proposal was the famous de Larosière report(2009)31, 
which highlighted, among other things mentioned above, the need for further harmonization, 
that would leave much less discretionary space for Member States. Acknowledging this, 
European Commission drafted the Consultation paper with such considerations. The MiFID 
review, or what came to be known as the MiFID II, was to push beyond the level of 
harmonization of the original MiFID, which showed early on that it leaves enough space for 
gold platting, causing arbitrage opportunities and hampering the functioning of the integrated 
market (Casey and Lannoo, 2009). Therefore, Commission addressed several issues that 
needed to be tackled. New definitions were proposed to replace old ones, which proved to be 
insufficient. Scope and exemption list was to be seriously addressed in order to account for 
recent market developments. In the area of trading venues and market infrastructure, a new 
term – Organized Trading Facility (OTF) was to be introduced, with the aim to move as much 
as OTC trading possible to some sort of organized venue which could have been supervised. 
One of the key contested issues since the age of ISD negotiation, pre-trade and post-trade 
transparency, was also addressed – MiFID introduced important measures, but they were 
almost entirely focused on equities – MiFID II, on the other hand, was supposed to be applied 
to other important instruments, such as bonds, and with markets such as dark pools. 
Introduction of Central Counterparties (CCP) was to lower the systematic risk of intertwined 
counterparties default chain, and therefore a counter-cyclical measure. Furthermore, 
Commission proposed to address commodity derivatives, which have proved to be very 
dangerous during the crisis and caused a lot of harmful speculation and volatility, especially 
with commodities such as wheat. As for technological improvements, the Commission 
recognizes the need to address two main questions – Algorithmic Trading, in general, and 
High Frequency Trading (HFT)32, as a special sort of it. Acknowledging principal-agent 
                                                 
31 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf  
32 Using computers to execute orders.  
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problems that became evident during the early application of MiFID, the Commission 
introduced several measures in the area of investor protection, know-your-customer (KYC) 
provisions, investment advice, inducements, improvement of best execution definition and 
other. Finally, new supervisory measures, to support the new regulation package are proposed 
(Commission, 2010) 
 The consultation process was to last until early February 2011. If one understands 
what an increase in scope would such a proposal assume, it does not wonder that the 
commission received a staggering amount of more than 4.200 answers (Commission, 2010), 
ranging from institutions like national governments and central banks, to all sorts of private 
organizations and other interested market participants.  
5.2 Position of Member States 
  
 As the main interest of this thesis is to analyze the position of member states, we shall 
focus on that aspect of the MiFID review consultations. First and foremost, it is important to 
stress that, unlike the previous ISD and MiFID negotiations, it is clearly noticeable that a 
paradigm shift occurred. Understanding the need to provide a joint response to the crisis, 
there was a willingness to increase transparency, investor protection and other measures, and 
less opposition coming from countries from the former Northern coalition. What seemed as 
unnecessary meddling od authorities into free markets domain a few years ago, was greeted 
and welcomed in the review process – the paradigm shifted from market-making to market-
shaping, from liberalizing to prescribing (Moloney, 2014). Nonetheless, a few years in the 
common MiFID regime did leave some winners and losers, brought some major changes of 
the European market infrastructure and some particular interests had to be satisfied. We do 
not have enough space, nor it is necessary, to present the position of each member state; 
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previous literature focused mostly on Germany, France, and the UK, and we shall, in turn, 
present briefly each. 
 As we have mentioned previously, German position during the previous negotiations 
was not very clear – it was somewhere between the Northern and the Southern coalition. 
Their banking system has specificities like no other in Europe, with two massive market 
players and a plethora of smaller ones, with conflicting preferences. Answering the call for 
consultations, German Ministry of Finance addressed several issues. When it comes to 
changes in definition of admission to trading, Germany finds that the new harmonized 
definition should not create additional requirements for admission to trading, due to existence 
of participants who do not interact on the regular basis, but also small and medium sized 
enterprises. They are against creation of OTFs, finding that the current regime of regulated 
markets, MTFs and SIs is enough to satisfy the needs of the market if modified to satisfy new 
market movements. German Ministry of Finance welcomes the need to transfer standardized 
OTC contracts to regulated markets and to fight the OTC opacity, in line with G20 
commitments and the new EMIR regulation. As for HFT, they call for further caution in 
terms of liquidity provision and consequences HFT can have on the market.  In principle, they 
agree with pre-trade and post-trade transparency guidelines, while they call for cost-benefit 
analysis. Regulation of commodity derivatives is welcomed. When it comes to data reporting, 
German Ministry of Finance finds seriously problems with full harmonization of reporting, 
due to differences in financial markets of Member states, finding that proposed regime might 
not be able to provide adequate data for monitoring. Echoing the position and the role small 
and medium sized financial services play in German market, the Ministry is calling for the 
future framework to provide exemptions and waivers for those entities that would differ from 
the requirements otherwise applicable by MiFID. One of the key contested issues, the matter 
of separation between investment advice that is independent and neutral, on the one hand, and 
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sales on the other, is supported by German, with objection to the wording (Consultation – 
German Ministry of Finance, 2011) 
 France is much more focused on OTC, as a country that has put the advocacy of 
fighting the OTC markets at the forefront (Economist.com, 2014b)33. They welcome the 
increase in transparency, new transaction reporting regime. With regards to admission to 
trading, France does not want it to effectively eliminate the difference between regulated 
markets and MTFs. This difference has been gradually decreasing over the years, as old stock 
exchanges (which are mostly regulated markets nowadays) have faced serious competition 
from the MTFs. It is no wonder that France is advocating this issue, knowing that they were 
the biggest advocates of the former concentration rule, trying to protect Paris Stock 
Exchange; also, most of the MTFs are coming from the UK, and is clearly visible that their 
introduction has seriously threatened and diminished the margins of the former stock 
exchanges (Ferrarini and Moloney, 2012). In similar fashion, France does not want the 
introduction of OTFs to blur the lines between that venue, on the one hand, and all the other 
previously used under MiFID, on the other. As for the types of instruments, they prefer to 
have as many derivatives as possible traded on a trading venue, in a standardized contract. 
Apart from fighting OTC opacity, France has been putting forward a lot of legislation related 
to limitation of HFT (IFLR, 2014)34. To level the playing field, they fall for a minimum tick35 
size to be prescribed, as it was known that HFT is potentially very destabilizing in certain 
market conditions and that they can seriously affect liquidity supply in stressful times. Unlike 
Germany, France does not welcome differences in treating SME institutions with a waiver 
from rules that apply to standard ones. Regarding transparency, France is continuing its 
position from the times of the ISD, strongly supporting improvements in both, such as 
reducing the delay to publish trade data, reinforcement and harmonization of rules for equity 
                                                 
33 Available at: https://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/01/regulating-capital-markets  
34 Available at: http://www.iflr.com/Article/3408545/French-HFT-rules-wont-clash-with-Mifid-II.html 
35 A HFT frequency terminology.  
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trading on RMs and MTFs, inclusion of non-equity instruments in transparency regimes. 
Finally, France supports a common third-country EU regime, which will be yet another 
contestation point, as we shall see further (Consultation – FR Authorities; AMF; 201136) 
 Finally, the United Kingdom has been always seen as the key player in the EU 
financial matters, therefore it is not surprising that the answer to consultation from the UK 
Treasury and their NCA was by far the longest one. It is important to keep in mind that the 
negotiation on MiFID (2011-2014), was the time of fierce bargaining between the 
government of David Cameron and the EU, on giving benefits to the UK in order to avoid 
Brexit (Ft.com, 2013b).  
 It seems that, along the lines of general discussion on MiFID, comparing to other 
member states, the position of the UK is not that different in terms of final goals, or principles 
– it is more of a matter of calibration. However, due to the amount of financial companies and 
their role in London, this country could not have ignored their interest in the time of Franco-
German convergence on most of the EU financial regulation matters (Ft.com, 2011). For 
example, when it comes to commodity derivatives, the UK is strongly against setting any kind 
of position limit on trading in this area. They oppose such classification of financial 
instruments that will enable exemption of certain energy trading deals, while it will heavily 
strike their oil market that heavily uses derivatives (Ft.com, 2013c) . Prior to MiFID, the UK 
made its own law addressing investment protection, to meet the problems created by the crisis 
(Ft.com, 2013d). Retail Distribution Review (RDR) as is the name of this measure has banned 
any commission for independent advice. Furthermore, the UK has strongly advocated and 
implemented prior to MiFID the unbundling of investment advice from the rest of the service, 
as it was shown that there have been serious misuses and clients did not know how much they 
actually had to pay for the service (Ft.com, 2013e). In line with their previous policies, they 
                                                 
36 All can be found in the consultation response database.  
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advocate further opening of the EU markets for third-countries, although they are against 
“exemptive relief for equivalent jurisdictions” (Consultation - Joint Response - UK Treasury 
& FSA, 2011), that could undermine free movement of capital from and to EU. As for HFT, 
they support robust risk measure, but are against any potential limitations that stem from the 
automatic assumption that HFT are inherently bad. Proposal to include OTF category is not 
very welcome, which is of no wonder, since it is aiming to curb dark pools, which are in 
proliferation in the UK (Ft.com, 2013f). In principle, the UK has nothing against increased 
transparency, but the word “calibration” shows up every now and then, echoing their 
proverbially reservation to heavily prescriptive regulation.  
 We have already mentioned the potential problems with assessing preferences of these 
states by using a response to consultation paper, which did not have an Article-like structure 
and was more principle based document, without thoroughly devised, concrete provisions. 
Therefore, of much more concrete importance and research value is the progress report 
document of ECOFIN (Economic and Financial Affairs Council), a configuration of the 
Council of the European Union, made in June 2012 (ECOFIN 11536, 2012)37, with the 
intention to discuss the MiFID II proposal received from the Commission. Apart from 
acquiring a general understanding, we decided not to include the minutes of the European 
Parliament sessions for a very straightforward reason – the nature of political engagement in 
the EP differs from the one in the Council. Using Council as the source, where individual 
member state interests are best reflected and most visible, we would more profoundly tackle 
our problem, which is the individual state preferences. That does not mean that these interests 
are not reflected in the EP, but the very nature of cross-border political grouping and the 
influence of different lobby groups prevents us from localizing and identifying individual 
member state preferences.  
                                                 
37 Document has a factual error in the heading. It shows the date of June 20 2011; however, it mentions Danish 
presidency, a period between January and June 2012). To be found at : 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011536%202012%20INIT  
   
48 
 
5.3 Negotiations and agreement on MiFID II 
 
 In October 2011, the European Commission issued the first MiFID II package 
proposal, with 101 Article (Commission, 2011). It was the result of the initial intentions, 
published in the consolations and featured feedback provided by the member states and other 
market participants. Following the procedure, it was sent to the European Parliament and to 
the Council, which started debating on the proposal in November, during the Polish 
presidency (ECOFIN 11536, 2012). The debate continued in January, when Denmark 
assumed presidency role and continued long throughout the year, finishing in early June, 
when the Danish collected individual member state positions in order to make a summary. 
The discussion was done in three stages – the first one debated, inter alia, on scope, OTFs, SI, 
post-trade transparency, investor protection and algorithmic trading. The subject of the 
second debate was third-country regime, while the third one covered a multitude of topics, 
among the most important being MTFs and RMs, clearing, standardized derivatives, position 
limits and other. Council ascertained that there is a general principle agreement, but many 
provisions remain to be discussed (ECOFIN 11536, 2012). 
 In the matters of scope and exemptions, it seems that several member states had 
problems with certain exemptions and the phrasing of those. They are mostly related to joint-
ventures in energy – namely electricity and gas, and are concerned with emission allowances 
classified as a financial instrument. Another contesting issue was the how to properly 
delineate between primary and ancillary services an investment firm provides; however, the 
Presidency finds that the agreement on that issue is of technical rather than political nature. 
Yet another technical issue was the oversight of structured products under MiFID II – it was 
welcomed by most member states, which also support finding a legal definition of structured 
products.  
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 In the matters of OTF, it seems that the agreement was easily achieved only in the 
matters of management of conflict of interest and on restriction on using trade discretion. 
Presidency has found two divided camps, unable to strike a deal. One camp advocates the 
creation of OTFs, but would like to see the rules applicable to them lenient. The other camp 
is, however, asking either to abolish the OTF category and move organized trading to already 
existent markets, or to create the OTF category but to make it much stricter. Presidency 
acknowledges that this issue is of high importance for Member states and that it tried to find a 
balance between their proposals, by accepting equal amount of amendments from both sides, 
but the issue is still far from an agreement (ECOFIN 11536, 2012). 
. Systematic Internalizers (SI), a category introduced by the previous MiFID, was in 
probably one of the worst provisions of the original directive, since at the time of the revision 
process, there were only 12 of those in the entire EU (Ferrarini and Moloney, 2012). During 
the consultation period, almost all member states have agreed that the regime is not 
performing well and that it needs change. Therefore, it is no wonder that the general 
agreement on SIs was achieved early on; the only problem was the size of the quotes that will 
determine a SI status (ECOFIN 11536, 2012).  
 The part of the proposal regarding trading venue transparency was meet with 
sympathies, while the Presidency amended provision related to pre-trade waivers for equity 
instruments. Still, there was a lack of consensus on pre-trade waivers of non-equity 
instruments, mainly in terms of thresholds and reference prices. Mandating ESMA to 
determine both pre-trade and post trade transparency waivers, from a technical point of view, 
was proposed, but the agreement was not reached. Still, it seems that this issue and the issue 
of corporate governance were not one of the most contested ones (ECOFIN 11536, 2012).  
 What was a very contested issue, and literature confirms, was the issue of inducements 
and investment advice (Busch and Ferrarini, 2017). A larger group of states were of opinion 
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that the inducements should not be banned if the client is fully aware of them and he receives 
the monetary benefits. However, a smaller group of states seemed “firmly committed” 
(ECOFIN 11536, 2012, p.7) to completely ban any sort of inducements. The Presidency 
seems to favor some kind of compromise in which the proposal would allow certain member 
state discretion and therefore provide a less harmonized solution. One last issue related to 
investor protection was the issue of UCITS, to which most of member states agreed that some 
of them are too complex to be traded as “execution only” for retailers. The matter was agreed 
in principle, with the issue of definition had to be resolved (ECOFIN 11536, 2012).  
 One of the least problematic area was the regulation of MTF, Regulated markets and 
SME growth markets – namely transparency, harmonization and issues of registration and 
authorization. Where some problems arose was the provision of MiFID II that obliges firms 
to record telephone conversations when giving investment advice or in other situations, in 
order to increase investor protection and tackle moral hazard. One member state was 
explicitly against the proposal framed in the way Commission did, while others requested 
further clarification. Algorithmic trading provisions caused concerns, after which Presidency 
adopted certain amendments. Most countries agree on the regime, while asking for more work 
to be done in the area of liquidity provision in particular moments (ECOFIN 11536, 2012). 
 A more technical issue, such as transaction reporting and data reporting services, there 
seems to be a general agreement; the Council finds that the final solution is near to be made. 
The Regulation part of the package, MiFIR, mostly deals with technical and reporting issues 
and it seems that nature of the regulation (directly applicable in national laws, without the 
need to transpose), reflects this harmonizing attitude of member states. Derivatives and 
clearing provisions did not cause too much controversy, although one member state was 
asking for a non-discriminatory clearing provision to be deleted. Another member state, on 
the contrary, wanted less restrictions in that area. It is an educated guess of the author that the 
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first one is Germany, while the other is highly likely to be the UK, due to the relations 
between London Stock Exchange and Deutsche Börse (Ft.com, 2016a, 2016b, 2012a; 
Economist.com, 2014b) euro clearing is one of the most contested issues in Brexit nowadays 
(Rankin, 2017). Presidency concludes that political solution will have to be made, instead of a 
technical one (ECOFIN 11536, 2012). 
 Commodity derivatives’ position management was one of the most important tenets of 
MiFID II. The document does not mention any major political issues – it mentions that one 
state is concerned with the legality of the proposal. However, Presidency finds that after some 
further clarification, a qualified majority would be possible to achieve. Even though not 
necessarily, invoking qualified majority, used whenever there is no possibility of unanimous 
agreement, does hint some political quarrels; financial magazines do say that issue of position 
limits of commodity derivatives was a contested issue during the entire negotiations, causing 
a lot of amendments in the European Parliament (Ft.com, 2012). 
 When it comes to competent authorities and sanctions, an agreement was likely to be 
achieved; however, provision related to publication of sanctions caused “strong concerns” 
(ECOFIN 11536, 2012, p.12) with some member states.  
 One of the most contested issues, as literature confirms (Bursch and Ferrarini, 2017), 
was the access and provision of services by third-country firms in the EU, regardless of 
establishment of a branch. The gravity of this issue best illustrates that “several Member 
States have expressed serious concerns and have strong reservations regarding the 
Commission proposal introducing a third country regime” (ECOFIN 11536, 2012, p.13). 
Those who object do not want the third-country regime to be in place and would prefer to 
retain their domestic rules. In the original MiFID, there were no calls for harmonized third-
country regime; the Commission was now pushing for its establishment. Presidency tried to 
circumvent this problem by demanding that a third-country firm would still have to establish 
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a branch in the country in which it wants to operate with retail clients (unlike MiFID member 
state passport, where this is not required). At the time of creation of the document, the 
agreement was far from being achieved (ECOFIN 11536, 2012). Delegated acts and final 
provisions were not discussed in detail, though the legal and technical nature of these 
provision rarely causes any heated debate. 
 During the MiFID negotiations, 6 countries presided over the Council – Poland, 
Denmark, Cyprus, Ireland, Lithuania and Greece. Following Danish ECOFIN progress report, 
we have another one, crafted during the presiding of Cyprus. The talks have intensified during 
this presidency – the working group met 15 times, in comparison to 6 times during Danish 
presidency (ECOFIN 16523/12, 2012). The issues on which a broad consensus and a likely 
agreement were: scope including exemptions (joint-venture exemptions, that were in question 
during Danish presiding, were agreed upon); issues of SI and post-trade transparency 
investment rules; Transparency for trading venues (while the problem of general waivers 
from pre-trade transparency in non-equity instruments remained); corporate governance; 
MTF, RMs and SME growth markets; authorization and operating conditions for investment 
firms (with the exception of telephone recording, which has not been resolved); algorithmic 
trading, HFT and direct electronic access (ECOFIN 16523/12, 2012).  
 During discussion on Data reporting services and transaction reporting, an issue came 
up that was not present during the previous talks – the consolidated tape. Basically, it is a 
system were price and volumes of publicly traded equities could be tracked by the investors. 
It has been a wish of European regulators for a long time to create a central consolidated tape 
for the EU. In the Council, two groups formed – one asking for single CT, and another one 
asking a standard market model of multiple providers. The compromise made by Cypriote 
presidency was to allow a multiple model, while enabling interference of public authorities in 
case of a market malfunction. An agreement seemed to be near (ECOFIN 16523/12, 2012). 
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 On the other hand, several previous problems continue, some without even moving 
from initial debates. Provisions related to OTFs; inducement; clearing (one group favoring 
allowing CCPs to refuse to clear trades executed in another trading venue, while the other 
groups strongly advocate non-discriminatory approach); position management (one member 
state still concern with legality issues). Publication of sanctions still considered to be a very 
contested issue, due to interference with legal traditions of individual member states 
(ECOFIN 16523/12, 2012). Finally, the issue that created heavy debate, third-country regime, 
continues to plague the negotiations, although there has been some progress, owing to the 
branch-establishment requirement approach.  
 After Cyprus, Ireland assumed presidency over the Council, putting MiFID talks 
among its top priorities (ECOFIN 11005/13, 2013) . After months of debating, in June 2013 
an agreement was reached and the proposal of the Council was promoted, while the 
Parliament agreed on its own in October 2012 (EP, 2012)38. Finally, after fierce negotiations 
(The Economist.com, 2014) and alignment of national preferences and political interests, in 
January 2014 an agreement was reached between the Commission, the Parliament and the 
Council (The Economist.com, 2014). European Parliament approved MiFID in April 2014, 
only weeks before EP elections (which might have been one reason that has speed up the 
compromise), while the Council approved it in May (Council, 2014)39. The initial effective 
date of implementation was to be January 3rd, 2017, but it was postponed a year later, as we 
have already mentioned.  
 
6 Data Analysis and Discussion  
 
                                                 
38Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-
2012-0303+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN  
39 Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2014/05/pdf/markets-in-financial-
instruments-council-adopts-new-rules/  
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 After building up the case through previous chapters, this section finally presents data 
analysis results, which will be followed by concrete discussion of the outcome and its 
possible interpretations, followed by a principle discussion on the approach and the results at 
the end. 
 6.1 Intra-document MiFID II analysis 
 
 In order to compare MiFID II Commission proposal, its adaptation by the Council and 
the final version, we have created 89 comparative articles, that correspond to their name and 
form in the final solution. We have discarded final provisions that were related to the legal 
aspects of application of the document, which are not of immediate interest for us. Initial 
Commission proposal, initiated in late 2011, has 33811 words; Council proposal, that came 
almost two years after, has 39655 words (increase of 17%), while the final solution that was 
adopted has 48715 words (an increase of staggering 44% in comparison to the initial 
proposal, and 23% increase comparing to the proposal of the Council). On average, an article 
changed from Commission proposal to Council proposal at the rate of 25%; from Council to 
the final solution at staggering 69%, while the growth of an article, from the initial proposal, 
to the final solution, was at the rate of 46%, which roughly corresponds to the overall increase 
as the proposal was approaching its final solution. 
 In the same time, a total of 42 (that means almost a half of all articles) article did not 
change more than 11% in both direction (being larger in size or smaller in size), when 
comparing the Commission proposal and the Council proposal. A total of 54 (more than half) 
of all articles did not change more than 15% (in both directions) between the Council 
proposal and the final solution. Finally, 44 articles (close to a half) did not change more than 
15% between the initial proposal and the final solution.  
 What are the key drivers of this change? Top 10 articles drive the change ranging from 
86% to staggering 336% percent (Commission – Council proposal). These articles are:  
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Table 1 Top 10 increase (Commission - Council proposal) 
Article name  % increase  
Publication of decisions +336% 
Specific requirements for OTFs +256% 
Exercise of supervisory powers and powers to 
impose sanctions 
+176% 
Suspension and removal of financial instruments 
from trading on a regulated market 
+119% 




Monitoring of compliance with the rules of the 
regulated market and with other legal obligations 
+101% 
Algorithmic trading +100% 
Monitoring of compliance with the rules of the 
MTF or the OTF and with other legal obligations 
+95% 
Organizational requirements – investment firms +86% 
 
 We see that, in the TOP10 changes, the first two, with the highest magnitude, are 
provisions that we have anticipated as likely to increase, due to differences in preferences of 
member states. In ECOFIN report, the first two provisions were highlighted as those that have 
caused serious quarrels between member states – publication of decisions due to possible 
conflicts of EU law with the national law, while the other one due to differing views as to 
what should constitute an OTF. It is important to stress that this is direct comparison between 
initial proposal and the influence of Council, where the preferences of member states are best 
visible and best represented. Increase in scope is significant, but due to its nature, very hard to 
interpret. Article “Membership of an authorized investor compensation scheme” has only 40 
words, therefore its increase in relative size probably does create a bias of its influence. Article 17 
(Organizational requirements for investment firms), also mentions inducements and telephone 
conversation recording, which according to ECOFIN were another point of contestation. Hence, in the 
Top10, our theory has predicted correctly at least 2 out of 10, with some argumentation that could 
stretch to some other provisions. Furthermore, those provisions drive change the most (the 
publications of sanctions increased the proposal more than threefold, while the additional OTF 
requirements have increased the initial proposal by 2.5). What seems to contradict our theory are 
provisions on algorithmic trading. However, even though ECOFIN mentioned that the general 
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agreement does exist, it did mention that member states are expecting streamlining of proposals and 
further clarification on them. Another point worth thinking about are the changes related to regulated 
markets – according to ECOFIN documents, there were no significant misunderstanding on the issue 
of regulated markets. Again, this could be related to streamlining of the initial Commission proposal, 
but at this point it is difficult to determine. 
 Top 10 articles driving the change from Council proposal to final solution are: 
Table 2 Top 10 increase (Council – MiFID II Directive) 
Article name  % increase  
Sanctions for infringements 160% 
Definitions 133% 
Position limits and position management controls 
in commodity derivatives 
112% 
Publication of decisions 102% 
Specific requirements for MTFs 73% 
Systems resilience, circuit breakers and electronic 
trading 
69% 
Provision of services at the exclusive initiative of 
the client 
69% 
General principles and information to clients 65% 
Requirements for the management body of a 
market operator 
51% 
Optional Exemptions 40% 
 
 Before analyzing this table above, it is important to give a general remark to what is 
being assessed in this case. Since the legislative power in the EU lies jointly on the Council of 
the EU and the European Parliament, it is necessary for these two bodies to find an 
agreement, often in cooperation with the Commission. Therefore, when talking about the 
document above, it is clear that a lot of difference between Council proposal and the final 
solution could be attributed to the influence of the European Parliament. Among the Top10 
articles above, the third and the fourth directly correspond to the issues that were put forward 
by individual member states, while Definitions and Optional Exemptions could fit a stretched 
definition. All the other articles are roughly corresponding to the area of investor protection 
and market supervision. This could be interpreted by the influence of the European 
Parliament – it has been noticed that since the crisis, the overall mood of the Parliament has 
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been shifted towards a stricter regulatory position, and the EP has put itself to the forefront of 
advocating for further regulatory burden to be imposed on financial sector (Ferrarini and 
Moloney, 2012). Issues like commodity positions were also seen by the EP as important, so 
the influence of the Parliament may have exacerbated the inclusion of additional provisions, 
which could explain long negotiations between three parties (Commission, Council, EP).  
 Finally, top ten articles driving positive change from initial proposal to the final 
solution, are: 
Table 3 Top 10 increase (Commission – MiFID II) 
Article name  % increase  
Publication of decisions 780% 
Specific requirements for OTFs 355% 
Sanctions for infringements 260% 
Position limits and position management controls 
in commodity derivatives 
248% 
General principles and information to clients 191% 
Suspension and removal of financial instruments 
from trading on a regulated market 
181% 
Systems resilience, circuit breakers and electronic 
trading 
168% 
Organizational requirements – investment firms 142% 
Algorithmic trading 133% 
Scope 106% 
 
 Among the Top5 drivers of the change from Commission to final solution, four 
correspond to our theoretical predictions (1st, 2nd, 4th and the 5th, which includes the 
inducement provision40). Other provisions mainly deal with supervisory issues and investor 
protection, echoing the need for a sound financial system, an agenda often put forward by the 
EP. This table might suggest that the interests of the Council and the EP are equally or 
relatively equally represented in the final proposal. Even though the percentage share is more 
driven by the Council preferences, the provisions that are usually seen as those under EP 
jurisdiction are quite long (in absolute numbers), and the fact that the increase percentage is 
                                                 
40 Furthermore, it contains another famous provision – Article 24 (12) “Member States may, in exceptional 
cases, impose additional requirements on investment firms in respect of the matters covered by this Article” 
(MiFID II Directive)  
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not very high, does not have to reflect lack of bargaining power.  We will turn now to analysis 
of the second hypothesis, after which we will address both in the final discussion part. 
 
6.2 MiFID I – MiFID II table analysis 
 
 
 When it comes to comparison between MiFID I and MiFID II provisions in order to 
infer some information related to gradual increase in harmonization and convergence, it is 
important to stress that, due to the official character of the repeals, that need to correctly 
correspond to each other, we should expect more valuable information, due to the possibility 
to extrapolate from more concrete data. In other words, in previous comparison, we were 
comparing between Articles, which often rendered comparison of articles that deal with scope 
or definition meaningless – because we could not easily determine where the change was 
coming from. On the other hand, however, we cannot provide a proper general overview in 
change between articles length, due to the comparison often being on a provision-against-
provision basis, often comparing parts of a provision.  
 That being said, we can inform that, out of 369 provision comparisons, a total of 167 
(more than a half) bring change within 20% (positive or negative) to the original provision, 
with a total of 56 provisions (around 1/6) bringing no change at all. This is interesting 
because it could be used as an argument that the original MiFID was in fact an excellent basis 
to begin with, since more than a half of its provisions did not change substantially. 
Furthermore, the biggest increases lie in the area that have been recognized as those that did 
not prove best in the crisis or that became obsolete by the flow of time. Some of the biggest 
changes were made on issues like organizational requirements, conduct of business, 
transaction reporting details (done through MiFIR, echoing the more technical nature of the 
Regulation), Systematic Internalizer (SI) definition (which increased almost six-fold, 
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reflecting the acknowledgment that this part of market infrastructure was one of the biggest 
failures of the original MiFID (Ferrarini and Moloney, 2012), pre-trade waivers, ancillary 
activities definition and other. On the other hand, there are 20 provisions which have 
decreased by more than 20% (with 4 completely abolished).  
 Finally, we shall present the Top 10 provisions that have decreased the most and 
provide a comment on that.  
 
 
 First, we will address the first four provisions that are completely missing from the 
later MiFID II package. Relation with third countries is probably the easiest one to interpret – 
the third-country regime was created on completely different assumptions than in the MiFID 
II, which in turn reflects the deletion. Second provision is related to the investment advice, 
which again has a completely different regime than in the first MiFID. In fact, all four 
Table 4 Top 10 decrease (MiFID I – MiFID II package) 
Provision and Article name % decrease 
Article 17(2) 








Relations with third countries 
-100% 
Article 5 (5) 
Requirement for Authorization 
-100% 
Article 41(1) 










Admission of financial instruments to trading 
-62% 
Article 12 
Initial capital endowment 
-36% 
Article 24(5) 
Transactions executed with eligible 
counterparties 
-36% 
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missing provisions have completely different regimes in the new package. Therefore, it does 
not make much sense to infer anything about harmonization, since the intended idea and 
regime related to it were set on completely different assumptions. 
 However, an interesting information comes from the Article 41(1) in the original 
MiFID, which deals with the right of the operator of the regulated market to suspend an 
instrument which no longer complies with certain rules. In MiFID II this article finishes on 
that. However, original article supposes that a Member state shall require that the operator 
informs competent authorities, which shall inform other Member states. It is difficult to 
address this issue. Since the repeal of the provision is done by only one provision, this 
obligation of member states does not exist anymore. One interoperation could be that certain 
harmonization has been achieved – another one could be that this provision has become 
obsolete, due to increased level of competencies afforded to supervisory authorities after the 
crisis. 
 Article 48(3) has been changed to reflect ESMA’s role in determining competent 
authorities, while that competence previously belonged to Commission. Article 2(1)(k) is 
related to commodity derivatives, of which a completely new regime has been established. 
However, when comparing provision between two MiFIDs, there seems to be an error – a 
provision related to commodity derivatives is repealed by a provision related to pension funds 
and UCITS. Be as it is, we abandon this provision in hope of inspecting the last three 
provisions. 
 Difference between word length of Article 40(5) and its successor is just a matter of 
semantics – a regulation that is being called upon has changed.  Similar is with Article 12 – it 
is referring to a provision that was expecting a revision, hence the longer sentence. As the 
final nail into the coffin of our hypothesis, the decrease of Article 24(5) is yet another result 
of referred provision wording.  
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 Faced with such an undisputable defeat, we conclude that using the aforementioned 
methodology, it is not possible neither to confirm nor to disprove the second hypothesis. 
Clearly, investigating convergence demands different approach. Possible problems to make 
any logical inference are the influence of crisis and the prescriptive nature of the second 
MiFID, which clearly disturbs the comparative balance.  
6.3 Closing discussion  
 
 In this chapter, we have analyzed data relevant for our two hypotheses. Since the 
second hypotheses leaves no space for debating, we will in turn here focus on the first 
hypothesis.  
 Judging from the results, we have successfully anticipated that the contested issues 
from the European Council will be reflected in the enlargement of the document. However, 
there are several issues with this prediction. Even though these provisions were the biggest 
drivers of movement, there were still in minority, comparing to the issues that were known to 
be relevant to the European Parliament. When we controlled for the Parliament influence 
(second comparison) we could clearly see how the number of driving provisions is 
decreasing, to accommodate for the proposals that were identified in the financial press and 
literature as those of the interest of the Parliament. One of the key concerns are the provisions 
related to clearing and third-country regime – the increase in proportion of these provisions 
was negligible. This could lead to the intention that some kind of bargaining might have been 
achieved, in which one (group) member state backed down from its interests, in order to 
receive some other benefits.  
 With this thought, we anticipate probably the biggest criticism to our paper - accuracy 
of member state preferences. We have addressed that issue at length during initial chapters. 
ECOFIN is a political configuration of high level and high importance and likely susceptible 
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to phrasing which do not adequately represent the reality. Furthermore, financial press is 
often a credible source – but at the end of the day, its objectives differ from an academic 
piece of literature, which has reviewers, who can criticize its methodology and data. 
Therefore, an academic author would restrain himself from speculation; that cannot be 
applied to a journalist with same considerations. However, we strongly believe that, 
considering the scope of this paper, the constraints that laid ahead of the author, the highly 
secretive and politically sensitive nature of the topic, we have presented a relatively accurate 
picture of member state preferences.  
 Another potential problem of our method lies in comparing proposals by the 
Commission with the same scrutiny as the one of the Council. The Commission does not only 
have member state disagreements in mind – it is also concerned how the European Parliament 
will welcome the proposal. Therefore, it might have purposefully created a short, principle 
based document, knowing that it will receive heavy amount of amendments, therefore 
disincentivizing the Commission to go too much in-depth. Therefore, the increase in the 
number of words does not come from conflict preferences, but it comes due to the unpolished 
nature of the initial proposal. On the other hand, an argument could claim that Commission 
proposal aims to provide the highest possible harmonization at the lowest possible level of 
complexity. Therefore, the initial document is what it would have been approved if the 
Commission was an executive power of a standard country, unlike the EU, with too many 
stakeholders. Having that in mind, the increase of a text length might be signalizing 
bargaining.   
 Addressing the predictive and explanatory power of our theories, we should state 
several points. We find predictive power of the theory of conflict preferences to be reasonably 
high when comparing the influence of the Council on the final proposal. It seems that we can 
clearly state that conflicting preferences tend to create long, ambiguous laws, with a lot of 
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discretionary possibilities for member states to gold plat. There was a clear match between 
Top10 provisions that showed the highest increase and the issues that were the most debated 
in the Council. However, the theory does not say that conflict preferences only influence 
Council proposal – its states that conflicting preferences of member states influence the final 
proposal, as the determinant, key factor. Comparing Council proposals and final proposals, 
we clearly see that the influence of the European Parliament is significant. Therefore, we 
might claim that conflict preferences of member states are just one of the determinants, 
maybe the most important one, but certainly not the only one out there. One could claim, 
however, that member state preferences are also very much alive and well in the Parliament, 
but are more difficult to extract. We find it unlikely. European Parliament decision-making 
works in a different political manner than the Council – lobby groups, issues of left-right 
political spectrum, the fact that MEPs are not necessarily reflecting the position of their 
government are just one of those problems. Another one could be that there are conflicting 
preferences within some member states, such as Germany, or even UK, whose investment 
banks were not very happy with new investor protection regime (Papaconstantinou, 2016).  
 Another problem this research has faced is the influence of the financial crisis. It is 
clearly impossible to contemplate on what would have happened without the crisis. As we 
have mentioned on several occasions, the crises shifted the regulatory paradigm in favor of 
more stringent rules, with the EP emerging as an important advocate. Side by side with the 
crisis is the technological progress in financial markets, which is becoming more and more 
difficult to track. Therefore, the enormous scope of the MiFID II package can still come as a 
consequence of improvement in financial technology, which certainly cannot be followed the 
same way in the UK and a post-2004 member state. This can seriously hamper the intentions 
of regulators to create a common, harmonized market – member states will be quicker than 
the EU to fight new practices, which will in turn exacerbate the conflict preferences problem 
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due to the need of member states to create a regime as closer to their own as possible. One 
example came from the UK, where inducements were tackled as a post-crisis reform, with the 
UK showing strong reservations to agreeing to some kind of commission being allowed 
(Bursch and Ferrarini, 2017). 
 
 The findings of this paper, however, partially support the initial argument – that even 
though European Union states have been living under the “same roof” for quite a long time, 
old national discrepancies are pretty much alive and well. However, one should not 
underestimate the effects of European Parliament and lobby groups – which can also affect 
the European Commission. Long negotiations (almost three years) testify to the problematic 
procedure of negotiating a deal of such scale and effect. Still, it seems that member states are 
less divided on the old North-South lines od division – the crisis has been a cohesive factor, 
shifting the paradigm in favor of what was known to be the position of southern member 
states. The quarrels during the MiFID II negotiations indeed seem benign, in comparison to 
those during MiFID I, not to mention the ISD. There was not a single issue in MiFID II 
negotiations that could measure in relevance with the controversial concentration rule. The 
original MiFID did put forward a lot of harmonization changes, to which the best proof is the 
number of provisions that did not substantially change. MiFID II, “a bigger bang” (The 











 The aim of this thesis was to address the increasing complexity of EU financial market 
regulation using the example of MiFID II package of reforms. The theoretical framework 
consists of three building-blocks, that build upon the long strand of literature on 
intergovernmentalism as the determinant factor that is shaping European Union integration, in 
general, and financial market integration, in particular.  
 This paper understands increase in complexity as an increase in article length and 
wordcount, maintaining that, due to differing preferences of member states, each of them will 
try to push for as similar legislation to their own as possible, to decrease the costs, short the 
learning period and provide competitive advantages for its firms. 
Two hypotheses were tackled – that financial legislation in the EU is still increasing, even 
controlling for the financial crisis and improvements in the technology; and that due to 
previous harmonization achievements, some provisions are actually shorter than in preceding 
regulatory frameworks. 
 First hypothesis, that claimed that conflicting member state preferences cause increase 
in the length of legal text, to accommodate exemptions, discretions and other, showed 
significant explanatory and predictive power. Initial legal provisions that caused a heated 
debate between member states, showed disproportionately high increase relative to their size 
in the final document, confirming the theory of member states preferences that shape the EU 
regulation. However, the findings of this paper are showing that other actors deserve to be 
credited as well; among them the European Parliament being the most important one.  
 The second hypothesis, that claimed that albeit increasing complexity, a relevant 
number of provisions decrease in size due to previous  convergence, proved impossible to 
test, due to methodological issues. However, the number of provisions that remains 
unchanged in the MiFID II, might testify to the same objective. 
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Scope  200  421  411 111% -2% 106% 
Exemptions  884  1346  1266 52% -6% 43% 
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2) Table addressing H2 (MiFID I – MiFID II/MiFIR) 
 







Scope        
Article 1(1) 11 Article 1(1) 33   200% 
Article 1(2) 69 Article 1(3) 78   13% 
Exemptions        
Article 2(1)(a) 36 Article 2(1)(a) 34   -6% 
Article 2(1)(b) 22 Article 2(1)(b) 21   -5% 
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Article 2(1)(c) 49 Article 2(1)(c) 49   0% 
Article 2(1)(d) 57 Article 2(1)(d) 116   104% 
Article 2(1)e 14 Article 2(1)(f) 13   -7% 
Article 2(1)(f) 36 Article 2(1)(g) 36   0% 
Article 2(1)(g) 32 Article 2(1)(h) 70   119% 
Article 2(1)(h) 22 Article 2(1)(i) 22   0% 
Article 2(1)(i) 37 Article 2(1)(j) 174   370% 
Article 2(1)(j) 29 Article 2(1)(k) 29   0% 
Article 2(1)(k) 63 Article 2(1)(i) 22   -65% 
Article 2(1)(l) 91 —      
Article 2(1)(m) 27 Article 2(1)(l) 27   0% 
Article 2(1)(n) 23 Article 
2(1)(m) 
23   0% 
Article 2(2) 70 Article 2(2) 71   1% 
Article 2(3) 78 Article 2(4) 313   301% 
Optional Exemptions       
Article 3(1) 307 Article 3(1) 436   42% 
Article 3(2) 36 Article 3(3) 36   0% 
Definitions        
Article 4(1)(1) 299 Article 4(1)(1) 287   -4% 
Article 4(1)(2) 139 Article 4(1)(2) 135   -3% 
Article 4(1)(3) 14 Article 4(1)(3) 15   7% 
Article 4(1)(4) 35 Article 4(1)(4) 35   0% 
Article 4(1)(5) 26 Article 4(1)(5) 51   96% 
Article 4(1)(6) 22 Article 4(1)(6) 22   0% 
Article 4(1)(7) 30 Article 
4(1)(20) 
171   470% 
Article 4(1)(8) 41 Article 4(1)(7) 43   5% 
Article 4(1)(9) 27 Article 4(1)(8) 27   0% 
Article 4(1)(10) 18 Article 4(1)(9) 18   0% 
Article 4(1)(11) 14 Article 
4(1)(10) 
14   0% 
Article 4(1)(12) 12 Article 
4(1)(11) 
12   0% 
Article 4(1)(13) 27 Article 
4(1)(18) 
25   -7% 
Article 4(1)(14) 80 Article 
4(1)(21) 
80   0% 
Article 4(1)(15) 55 Article 
4(1)(22) 
56   2% 
Article 4(1)(16) 25 Article 
4(1)(14) 
25   0% 
Article 4(1)(17) 13 Article 
4(1)(15) 
13   0% 
Article 4(1)(18) 102 Article 
4(1)(44) 
102   0% 
Article 4(1)(19) 32 Article 32   0% 




Article 4(1)(20) 118 Article 
4(1)(55) 
197   67% 
Article 4(1)(21) 60 Article 
4(1)(56) 
61   2% 
Article 4(1)(22) 22 Article 
4(1)(26) 
22   0% 
Article 4(1)(23) 11 Article 
4(1)(27) 
20   82% 
Article 4(1)(24) 40 Article 
4(1)(28) 
29   -28% 
Article 4(1)(25) 72 Article 
4(1)(29) 
72   0% 
Article 4(1)(26) 76 Article 
4(1)(30) 
76   0% 
Article 4(1)(27) 57 Article 
4(1)(31) 
89   56% 
Article 4(1)(28) 27 Article 
4(1)(32) 
28   4% 
Article 4(1)(29) 28 Article 
4(1)(33) 
29   4% 
Article 4(1)(30) 12 Article 
4(1)(35)(b) 
66   450% 
Article 4(1)(31) 143 Article 
4(1)(35) 
128   -10% 
Article 4(2) 45 Article 4(2) 57   27% 
Requirement for 
Authorization  
      
Article 5(1) 55 Article 5(1) 56   2% 
Article 5(2) 38 Article 5(2) 33   -13% 
Article 5(3) 41 Article 5(3) 127   210% 
Article 5(4) 71 Article 5(4) 73   3% 
Article 5(5) 59     -
100% 
Scope of authorization       
Article 6(1) 57 Article 6(1) 57   0% 
Article 6(2) 36 Article 6(2) 36   0% 
Article 6(3) 46 Article 6(3) 50   9% 
Procedures for granting and 
refusing requests for 
authorisation 
      
Article 7(1) 33 Article 7(1) 33   0% 
Article 7(2) 61 Article 7(2) 58   -5% 
Article 7(3) 23 Article 7(3) 23   0% 
Article 7(4) Missing Article 7(4) 
and (5) 
208    
Withdrawal of authorisation       
Article 8(a) 45 Article 8(a) 45   0% 
   
79 
 
Article 8(b) 15 Article 8(b) 15   0% 
Article 8(c) 22 Article 8(c) 24   9% 
Article 8(d) 20 Article 8(d) 25   25% 
Article 8(e) 23 Article 8(e) 23   0% 
Persons who effectively direct 
the business 
      
Article 9(1) 88 Article 9(1) 
and (3) 
366   316% 
Article 9(2) 43 Article 9(5) 44   2% 
Article 9(3) 61 Article 9(4) 91   49% 
Article 9(4) 91 Article 9(6) 132   45% 
Shareholders and members 
with qualifying holdings 
      
Article 10(1) 127 Article 10(1) 130   2% 
Article 10(2) 47 Article 10(2) 47   0% 
Article 10(3) 190 Article 11(1) 358   88% 
Article 10(4) 112 Article 11(2) 228   104% 
Article 10(5) 132 Article 11(3) 122   -8% 
Article 10(6) 173 Article 10(3), 
11(4) 
185   7% 
Article 10a(1) Missing Article 12(1) 136    
Article 10a(2) Missing Article 12(2) 118    
Article 10a(3) Missing Article 12(3) 62    
Article 10a(4) Missing Article 12(4) 94    
Article 10a(5) Missing Article 12(5) 24    
Article 10a(6) Missing Article 12(6) 19    
Article 10a(7) Missing Article 12(7) 38    
Article 10a(8) Missing Article 12(8) 
and (9) 
158    
Article 10b(1) Missing Article 13(1) 285    
Article 10b(2) Missing Article 13(2) 40    
Article 10b(3) Missing Article 13(3) 39    
Article 10b(4) Missing Article 13(4) 72    
Article 10b(5) Missing Article 13(5) 41    
Membership of an authorised 
Investor Compensation 
Scheme 
      
Article 11 41 Article 14 64   56% 
Initial capital endowment       
Article 12 67 Article 15 43   -36% 
Organisational requirements       
Article 13(1) 22 Article 16(1) 29   32% 
Article 13(2) 44 Article 16(2) 41   -7% 
Article 13(3) 40 Article 16(3) 308   670% 
Article 13(4) 36 Article 16(4) 36   0% 
Article 13(5) 119 Article 16(5) 188   58% 
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Article 13(6) 58 Article 16(6) 84   45% 
Article 13(7) 49 Article 16(8) 52   6% 
Article 13(8) 37 Article 16(9) 38   3% 
Article 13(9) 64 Article 16(11) 306   378% 
Article 13(10) 63 Article 16(12) 61   -3% 
Trading process and 
finalisation of transactions in 
an MTF 
      
Article 14(1) 47 Article 18(1), 
Article 19(1) 
119   153% 
Article 14(2) 84 Article 18(2) 90   7% 
Article 14(3) 90 Article 19(4) 99   10% 
Article 14(4) 39 Article 18(3), 
Article 19(2) 
62   59% 
Article 14(5) 67 Article 18(6), 
Article 19(3) 
201   200% 
Article 14(6) 50 Article 18(8) 56   12% 
Article 14(7) 37 Article 18(9) 40   8% 
Relations with third countries       
Article 15 502 —    -
100% 
Regular review of conditions 
for initial authorisation 
      
Article 16(1) 30 Article 21(1) 27   -10% 
Article 16(2) 44 Article 21(2) 44   0% 
Article 16(3) 46 —    -
100% 
General obligation in respect 
of on-going supervision 
      
Article 17(1) 60 Article 22 59   -2% 
Article 17(2) 44 —    -
100% 
Conflicts of Interest       
Article 18(1) 61 Article 23(1) 88   44% 
Article 18(2) 63 Article 23(2) 79   25% 
Article 18(3) 99 Article 23(4) 76   -23% 
Conduct of business 
obligations when providing 
invest-ment services to clients 
      
Article 19(1) 48 Article 24(1) 50   4% 
Article 19(2) 31 Article 24(3) 31   0% 
Article 19(3) 106 Article 24(4) 370   249% 
Article 19(4) 71 Article 25(2) 127   79% 
Article 19(5) 192 Article 25(3) 208   8% 
Article 19(6) 237 Article 25(4) 411   73% 
Article 19(7) 66 Article 25(5) 68   3% 
Article 19(8) 38 Article 25(6) 259   582% 
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Article 19(9) 61 Article 24(6), 
Article 25(7) 
153   151% 
Article 19(10) 113 Article 24(13), 
Article 24(14), 
Article 25(8) 
430   281% 
Provision  of  services  
through  the  medium  of  
another investment firm 
      
Article 20 165 Article 26 166   1% 
Obligation to execute orders 
on terms most favourable to 
the client 
      
Article 21(1) 69 Article 27(1) 247   258% 
Article 21(2) 52 Article 27(4) 52   0% 
Article 21(3) 187 Article 27(5) 214   14% 
Article 21(4) 89 Article 27(7) 114   28% 
Article 21(5) 31 Article 27(8) 47   52% 
Article 21(6) 168 Article 27(9) 139   -17% 
Client order handling rules       
Article 22(1) 71 Article 28(1) 71   0% 
Article 22(2) 130 Article 28(2) 139   7% 
Article 22(3) 134 Article 28(3) 95   -29% 
Obligations  of  investment  
firms  when  appointing  tied 
agents 
      
Article 23(1) 57 Article 29(1) 55   -4% 
Article 23(2) 180 Article 29(2) 184   2% 
Article 23(3) 198 Article 29(3) 172   -13% 
Article 23(4) 115 Article 29(4) 115   0% 
Article 23(5) 22 Article 29(5) 22   0% 
Article 23(6) 23 Article 29(6) 30   30% 
Transactions executed with 
eligible counterparties 
      
Article 24(1) 69 Article 30(1) 131   90% 
Article 24(2) 128 Article 30(2) 120   -6% 
Article 24(3) 127 Article 30(3) 128   1% 
Article 24(4) 56 Article 30(4) 22   -61% 
Article 24(5) 97 Article 30(5) 66   -32% 
Obligation to uphold integrity 
of markets, report transac-
tions and maintain records 
      
Article 25(1) 78   Article 
24 
55 -29% 
Article 25(2) 75   Article 
25(1) 
112 49% 
Article 25(3) 100   Article 
26(1) 
200 100% 




Article 25(4) 39   Article 
26(3) 
192 392% 
Article 25(5) 96   Article 
26(7) 
418 335% 
Article 25(6) 54   Article 
26(8) 
64 19% 
Article 25(7) 81   Article 
26(9) 
475 486% 
Monitoring of compliance 
with the rules of the MTF and 
with other legal obligations 
      
Article 26(1) 75 Article 31(1) 124      
Article 26(2) 87 Article 31(2) 
and (3) 
139      
Obligation  for  investment  
firms  to  make  public  firm 
quotes 
      




Article 27(2) 64    Article 
14(6) 
84 31% 




Article 27(4) 51    Article 
16 
48 -6% 
Article 27(5) 80    Article 
17(1) 
80 0% 
Article 27(6) 97    Article 
17(2) 
92 -5% 
Article 27(7) 251    Article 
17(3) 
235 -6% 
Post-trade disclosure by 
investment firms 
      
Article 28(1) 83    Article 
20(1) 
58 -30% 
Article 28(2) 69    Article 
20(2) 
90 30% 




requirements for MTFs 
      





Article 29(2) 91    Article 484 432% 










requirements for MTFs 
      




Article 30(2) 102    Article 
7(1) 
203 99% 
Article 30(3) 138    Article 
7(2) 
276 100% 
Freedom to provide 
investment services and 
activities 
      
Article 31(1) 100 Article 34(1) 102     2% 
Article 31(2) 171 Article 34(2) 263     35% 
Article 31(3) 56 Article 34(3) 56     0% 
Article 31(4) 66 Article 34(4) 66     0% 
Article 31(5) 49 Article 34(6) 52     6% 
Article 31(6) 113 Article 34(7) 119     5% 
Article 31(7) Missing Article 34(8) 
and (9) 
141      
Establishment of a branch       
Article 32(1) 104 Article 35(1) 130     20% 
Article 32(2) 193 Article 35(2) 271     29% 
Article 32(3) 72 Article 35(3) 72     0% 
Article 32(4) 77 Article 35(4) 77     0% 
Article 32(5) 44 Article 35(5) 44     0% 
Article 32(6) 53 Article 35(6) 54     2% 
Article 32(7) 117 Article 35(8) 149     21% 
Article 32(8) 60 Article 35(9) 60   0% 
Article 32(9) 69 Article 35(10) 69   0% 
Article 32(10) Missing Article 35(11) 
and (12) 
141    
Access to regulated markets       
Article 33(1) 111 Article 36(1) 111   0% 
Article 33(2) 30 Article 36(2) 30   0% 
Access to central 
counterparty, clearing and 
settlement 
facilities and right to 
designate settlement system 
      
Article 34(1) 99 Article 37(1) 118   16% 
Article 34(2) 177 Article 37(2) 183   3% 
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Article 34(3) 40 —     
Provisions  regarding  central  
counterparty,  clearing  and 
settlement arrangements in 
respect of MTFs 
      
Article 35(1) 56 Article 38(1) 57   2% 
Article 35(2) 107 Article 38(2) 106   -1% 
Authorisation and applicable 
law 
      
Article 36(1) 178 Article 44(1) 106   -68% 
Article 36(2) 78 Article 44(2) 72   -8% 
Article 36(3) 56 Article 44(3) 58   3% 
Article 36(4) 36 Article 44(4) 42   14% 
Article 36(5) 105 Article 44(5) 110   5% 
Article 36(6) Missing Article 44(6) 10    
Requirements for the 
management of the regulated 
mar-ket 
      
Article 37(1) 117 Article 45(1) 
and (8) 
97   -21% 
Article 37(2) 53 Article 45(7) 
second 
subparagraph 
49   -8% 
Requirements  relating  to  
persons  exercising  
significant influence over the 
management of the regulated 
market 
      
Article 38(1) 29 Article 46(1) 29   0% 
Article 38(2) 93 Article 46(2) 94   1% 
Article 38(3) 47 Article 46(3) 47   0% 
Organisational requirements       
Article 39 244 Article 47(1) 249   2% 
Admission of financial 
instruments to trading 
      
Article 40(1) 58 Article 51(1) 58   0% 
Article 40(2) 34 Article 51(2) 39   13% 
Article 40(3) 88 Article 51(3) 88   0% 
Article 40(4) 31 Article 51(4) 31   0% 
Article 40(5) 125 Article 51(5) 77   -62% 
Article 40(6) 170 Article 51(6) 197   14% 
Suspension and removal of 
instruments from trading 
      
Article 41(1) 136 Article 52(1) 70   -94% 
Article 41(2) 87 Article 52(2) 663   87% 
Access to the regulated 
market 
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Article 42(1) 29 Article 53(1) 31   6% 
Article 42(2) 99 Article 53(2) 91     -9% 
Article 42(3) 77 Article 53(3) 79     3% 
Article 42(4) 76 Article 53(4) 78     3% 
Article 42(5) 30 Article 53(5) 33     9% 
Article 42(6) 145 Article 53(6) 170     15% 
Article 42(7) 36 Article 53(7) 33     -9% 
Monitoring of compliance 
with the rules of the regulated 
market and with other legal 
obligations 
      
Article 43(1) 63 Article 54(1) 88     28% 
Article 43(2) 95 Article 54(2) 
and (3) 
181     48% 
Pre-trade transparency 
requirements for regulated 
markets 
      














requirements for regulated 
mar-kets 
      




Article 45(2) 97    Article 
7(1) 
203 109% 
Article 45(3) 100    Article 
7(2) 
276 176% 
Provisions regarding central 
counterparty and clearing and 
settlement arrangements 
      
Article 46(1) 50 Article 55(1) 62     19% 
Article 46(2) 104 Article 55(2) 116     10% 
List of regulated markets       
Article 47 95 Article 56 113     16% 
Designation of competent 
authorities 
      
Article 48(1) 63 Article 67(1) 70     10% 
Article 48(2) 254 Article 67(2) 248     -2% 
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Article 48(3) 38 Article 67(3) 23     -65% 
Cooperation  between  
authorities  in  the  same  
Member State 
      
Article 49 101 Article 68 113     11% 
Powers to be made available 
to competent authorities 
      
Article 50(1) 72 Article 69(1), 
72(1) 
105     31% 
Article 50(2) 191 Article 69(2) 599     68% 
Administrative sanctions       
Article 51(1) 76 Article 70(1) 
and (2) 
301     75% 
Article 51(2) 21 Article 70(5) 29     28% 
Article 51(3) 51 Article 71(1) 335     85% 
Article 51(4) Missing Article 71(4) 101      
Article 51(5) Missing Article 71(5) 28      
Article 51(6) Missing Article 71(6) 56      
Right of appeal       
Article 52(1) 69 Article 74(1) 78     12% 
Article 52(2) 82 Article 74(2) 89     8% 
Extra-judicial mechanism for 
investors' complaints 
      
Article 53(1) 39 Article 75(1) 61     36% 
Article 53(2) 25 Article 75(2) 23   -9% 
Article 53(3) Missing Article 75(3) 39    
Professional secrecy       
Article 54(1) 109 Article 76(1) 112   3% 
Article 54(2) 43 Article 76(2) 44   2% 
Article 54(3) 127 Article 76(3) 141   10% 
Article 54(4) 93 Article 76(4) 110   15% 
Article 54(5) 33 Article 76(5) 33   0% 
Relations with auditors       
Article 55(1) 263 Article 77(1) 205   -28% 
Article 55(2) 45 Article 77(2) 55   18% 
Obligation to cooperate       
Article 56(1) 132 Article 79(1) 292   55% 
Article 56(2) 69 Article 79(2) 69   0% 
Article 56(3) 53 Article 79(3) 51   -4% 
Article 56(4) 109 Article 79(4) 115   5% 
Article 56(5) 69 Article 79(8) 58   -19% 
Article 56(6) Missing Article 79(9) 67    
Cooperation in supervisory 
activities, on-the-spot 
verifica-tions or in 
investigations 
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Article 57(1) 136 Article 80(1) 139   2% 
Article 57(2) Missing Article 80(2) 43    
Article 57(3) Missing Article 80(3) 
and (4) 
141    
Exchange of information       
Article 58(1) 107 Article 81(1) 130   18% 
Article 58(2) 90 Article 81(2) 99   9% 
Article 58(3) 143 Article 81(3) 142   -1% 
Article 58(4) 27 Article 81(4) 63   57% 
Article 58(5) 90 Article 81(5) 98   8% 
Article 58a Missing Article 82 122    
Refusal to cooperate       
Article 59 135 Article 83 112   -21% 
Inter-authority consultation 
prior to authorisation 
      
Article 60(1) 81 Article 84(1) 86   6% 
Article 60(2) 88 Article 84(2) 93   5% 
Article 60(3) 102 Article 84(3) 102   0% 
Article 60(4) Missing Article 84(4) 70    
Powers for host Member 
States 
      
Article 61(1) 28 Article 85(1) 34   18% 
Article 61(2) 77 Article 85(2) 83   7% 
Precautionary  measures  to  
be  taken  by  host  Member 
States 
      
Article 62(1) 213 Article 86(1) 250   15% 
Article 62(2) 209 Article 86(2) 240   13% 
Article 62(3) 194 Article 86(3) 235   17% 
Article 62(4) 43 Article 86(4) 43   0% 
Article 62a(1) Missing Article 87(1) 21    
Article 62a(2) Missing Article 87(2) 41    
Exchange of information with 
third countries 
      
Article 63(1) 252 Article 88(1) 397   37% 
Article 63(2) 52 Article 88(2) 52   0% 
Article 64  —     
Article 64a  —     
Article 65  —     
Article 66  —     
Article 67  —     
Article 68  —     
Article 69  —     
Article 70  —     
Article 71  —     
Article 72  —     
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Article 73  —     
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